![USAID - From the American People]

Final Performance Evaluation of the USAID/OTI Kyrgyz Republic Transition Initiative (KRTI)

Final Evaluation Report

Final Performance Evaluation of the USAID/OTI Kyrgyz Republic Transition Initiative (KRTI)

Contract No. AID-OAA-I-13-00006; TO AID-OAA-TO-13-00018.

Final Evaluation Report

Photo Credit: Emery Brusset, Team Leader.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS

DoS	Department of State
EC	European Commission
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FOG	Fixed Obligation Grant
FT	Full Time
GGPAS	Good Governance/Public Administration Strengthening
GIU	Geographic Information Unit
GM	Grants Manager
HQ	Headquarters
ICAF	Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
IP	Implementing Partner
IRG	International Resources Group
KII	Key Informant Interview
KRTI	Kyrgyz Republic Transition Initiative
LOE	Level of Effort
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PDO	Program Development Officer
PPR	Program Performance Reviews
SI	Social Impact
SMT	Senior Management Team
SOW	Scope of Work
SRS	Strategic Review Sessions
STTA	Short Term Technical Assistance
TO	Task Order
ToC	Theory of Change
TDY	Temporary Deployment
TPM	Team Planning Meeting
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

- The Kyrgyz Republic is beset by simmering tensions and weak governance, revolving around regional ethnic and cultural fault lines.[1] Religion is becoming increasingly salient, but remains secondary as a factor of transition. Over the years, there has been a dramatic decline of the state and of social services. While its society remains open and tolerant to international involvement, the simmering tensions, strength of geopolitical influences, and absence of democratic traditions increase the unpredictability of the future and leave considerable room for political entrepreneurs to create instability.The explosions of political violence which took place in the Kyrgyz Republic in April and June 2010 were followed immediately by an United States Agency for International Development Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) deployment to establish an office in the capital Bishkek, and then another in Osh, located in the turbulent Fergana Valley. This was done during a time when OTI was highly constrained for resources globally, particularly in human resources, leading to a heavy reliance on short-term staff. OTI nevertheless rapidly established a committed team contracted by International Resources Group (IRG),[2] which implemented its first OTI SWIFT III program.

- OTI established two objectives for Kyrgyz Republic Transition Initiative (KRTI): (1) to address sources of instability at the community level and (2) to support the Kyrgyz Republic's ongoing democratic transition. Over the next 31 months, the KRTI issued 448 service contracts and grants to 234 partners totalling $20 million, for an overall cost of $33.1 million. Strong relations were established with the USAID Mission and US Embassy, ensuring complementarity and responsiveness to strategic needs. The program ended in in December 2013, at a time of fragile stability in the country.

- This evaluation was carried out between July and November 2013. Three successive visits enabled the team to carefully map the context, conduct 18 case-studies, and validate their findings through a highly consultative process. The aim of the evaluation was to assess the responsiveness of the program to the country's transition needs and the impact the program achieved. The methodology focused on identifying drivers of transition and then assessing the effects of the activities in relation to these drivers. This was done by combining responses to evaluation questions and through the development of an impact balanced score card.

Key Findings

- **Strategy**: The wide coverage adopted by KRTI, even in the more remote areas, was accurately targeted at sources of tension and disaffection. In broad terms, the focus of KRTI was first on cash-for-work, then on reconciliation, public spaces and inter-ethnic relations, and then shifted to a greater emphasis on state legitimacy, and key aspects of governance at the national level. KRTI responded well to the shifting political realities of the country, and filled the operating space it was given. A total of 127 activities, as

---

[1] The tensions are not necessarily ethnic in nature, but it is important to note that some 71% of the population is of Kyrgyz origin, 14% Uzbek, 8% Russian, plus a number of other communities.
[2] IRG became part of Engility in 2012 but will be referred to as IRG herein.

described in the activity database, have complemented the work of other donor organizations such as the British Embassy, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Soros Foundation, the European Commission (EC), and the United Nations (UN), which all provided a surge of funding following the 2010 events. The program then focused on its hand-over to two USAID follow-up programs.

- **Relevance**: There is a strong correlation between the drivers identified by the focus groups consulted by the evaluation and those through the clusters used by KRTI. While the drivers are highly contextualized, the program was seen to shadow them in all their nuances and key institutions, and as they evolved in time and space. The ability of KRTI to move with the context is remarkable and reflects a clear strategic advantage over more linear and rigid donor programming.

- **Adaptability:** The core strength of KRTI is to trigger activities in a highly dynamic and creative manner, tackling well-identified problems at all levels of society. However, the program staff, due to the workload and intricacy of approval and management of each grant and service contract, maintained a limited relationship with local partners, particularly the awardees. The projects that received funding are the ones where the proposals were well-argued, largely, it should be noted as a result of working closely with OTI to fine-tune these proposals. OTI rejected some potentially good activities because it was not able to recognize these due to a more narrow focus on the formal aspects of proposals, such as the combination of irrigation infrastructure work with follow up social projects in the same areas.

- **Planning and assumptions**: The theories of change (ToCs) underlying the program have been carefully defined and are coherent and followed within each cluster. At the same time the dialogue with partners tends to be dominated by concerns about delivery. KRTI found it difficult to communicate its strategic objective through its management chain down to the awardees and on to their own operational partners. The case-studies show that core assumptions remained untested in the delivery of the activities, in some cases leading to lost opportunity for synergy between activities. This is the case, for example, where the culture of using the internet took longer than anticipated which had negative consequences for parliamentary accountability initiatives. In another example, suspicions between local government and civil society clouded the coordinated strategy devised by KRTI.

- **Capacity building**: The use of frequent short-term technical assistance (STTA) inputs to strengthen the technical delivery of the priority components received widespread praise from the partners. More developed partners were able to gain capacity from the program, through a strengthened image, and access to additional funding and know-how. However, some grants implemented in a weaker environment and with little time required a more directive approach and, in some cases, undermined the development of managerial, administrative, and financial capacity of grantees. This is due to cases of conflicting guidance. While capacity building was not one of the objectives of KRTI, this was an important aspect for the duration of its influence.

- **Impact**: The program has achieved clear effects on the key drivers of transition in the country, when and where they arose. The evaluation used a balanced score card methodology to assess the relevance, extent, and duration of the impact achieved in 18

case-studies visited by the team. Out of a maximum score of five, the 54 activities scored 4.6 for relevance, and 3.7 for extent and duration of influence, which is much above the average observed in similar OTI evaluations by the evaluation team members. The overall impact score is 12.1 out of a maximum of 15. The greatest impacts are noted in media and public perceptions, and in social infrastructure (see **Annex G** for additional detail on the case-studies). In some cases, surveys show that popular attitudes are determined by a wider number of variables than KRTI was able to influence, leading to a certain dilution of its influence when dealing with community-level change. The evaluation also found that impact of a few activities was much higher than the impact of many others.

- **Lessons learned**: The program built relationships with partners which today have the capacity to continue to deliver impact. The architecture of KRTI was appropriate for such diffuse crises which required varied responses, in other words, the tracking of highly diverse actors at specific points in time. While the evaluation did not consider the fiduciary aspects of the Fixed Obligation Grants (FOGs), it observed that their introduction halfway into the program facilitated the sense of ownership of the activities by the awardees.

- **Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)**: The program placed a high standard on M&E, and has been able to effectively monitor grant implementation and inform new undertakings. A large number of studies were produced over specific areas of activity, which must be seen to include OTI's standard management assessment tools. However, there was limited coordination of the considerable knowledge generated. KRTI can be described as having generated a library of M&E knowledge, but the absence of a common context-based frame of reference beyond the database and the OTI managerial blueprint reduced KRTI's ability to speak of the value of its many individual outcomes.

Overarching Conclusions

- The start-up of the program was highly complex due to its speed, and the scarcity of experienced OTI-aware expatriate personnel at the time of the launch. This preliminary disadvantage was fully overcome and the final handover in 2013 shows a well-documented evidence trail demonstrating verifiable effects in all sectors of activity.

- The energetic stakeholder engagement was combined with the experimental approach that characterizes OTI, such as probing and capitalizing on the more promising opportunities. This generated a significant level of social capital which allowed KRTI to take advantage of the openness of the country. There was a certain degree of misunderstanding about the intent of the initiative amongst some partners. Insightful ideas were supported by the program but in some cases fail to take root locally as much as they could have.

- The logical chain of results that provide structure to the interventions fully flows downwards from the management of KRTI, and was strategically conceived, but fails to connect laterally amongst the activities themselves at the tactical level of the partners. The local partners in some cases have difficulty grasping the breadth and logic of change, leading to a certain loss of dynamism.

Recommendations:

1. The mode of operation in OTI is essentially about corporate culture using a large dose of tacit knowledge. KRTI has shown that hiring the right people and ensuring continuity is important to secure this—as important as blending into the context, which OTI does well and within which it is able to operate strategically. The broader OTI should continue to focus on personnel as a key resource, particularly developing a pool of "anchor-people" such as in OTI's "Bull Pen," and through other STTA resources.

2. There should be a clearer formulation of the roles of different teams engaging in M&E, such as those deployed for STTA, Strategic Review Sessions (SRSs), Program Performance Reviews (PPR), rolling assessments (RAs), and surveys. While KRTI deployed considerably more resources for this than other OTI programs, it highlighted the need for stronger inter-connections between the different types of assessments. OTI should think about creating one or two roving evaluation specialists (who would not be given operational tasks), who could link existing assessment tools and those which KRTI has designed, such as case-studies or surveys. This role could include training for the Program Development Officers (PDOs) and Grants Managers (GMs) to strengthen their ability to analyze the performance of their activities in relation to the context, not just in relation to the individual activity fields of the database.

3. This evaluation capacity should rely on an objective and situational frame of reference but remains rooted in some constants within the environment. This will provide a frame against which the activities can be assessed for impact, in the absence of experimental or baseline evidence. The points of reference should be context drivers (defined as types of events and trends, rather than causes or clusters) which are decisive conditions which OTI must affect to be able to claim to have an impact on the broader transition.

4. The progress that OTI is making in defining its ToCs and clusters should be introduced into the database, possibly using fields with a more visual representation, to present the logic within and between the clusters. This should contain not just the vertical linkages to overall issues (ideally drivers), but also horizontal linkages between a succession of activities where there is a strategic progression. The important practice within OTI of linking grants together into sequences that represent entry, follow-up, maximum impact and then hand-over, should be better captured and analyzed. The existing Geographic Information Unit (GIU) mapping could be expanded to deliver such analysis.

5. The use of STTA to tap into specific forms of technical knowledge is a model that should be used in other countries. It should include strong feedback loops into the overall strategy and should be particularly focused on presenting the findings in ways that are directly useful for programming.

6. The PDOs and GMs should be assessed on a broader range of metrics: the numbers of activities funded, the quality of delivery and tracking of outputs, but also the ability to engage in strategic dialogue with local partners and to obtain endorsement of the KRTI strategy by those partners. This could translate into new initiatives that will correspond even better to KRTI's strategic intent and to the local partners' advantage.

INTRODUCTION

COUNTRY CONTEXT

The Kyrgyz Republic is a country beset by significant sociopolitical and socioeconomic challenges to its transition to a stable democracy. This mountainous, landlocked country in the heart of Central Asia has seen dramatic population shifts since its independence in 1991. Its population has grown by nearly 18 percent, from 4.5 to 5.3 million, in the two decades since independence, with the rising poverty and unemployment rates of the 1990s forcing a considerable and destabilizing rural-urban migration shift. Although official data indicates that two thirds of the population still reside in rural areas, it is likely that a greater share of the population is now concentrated in urban areas such as Bishkek, Osh, and Jalal-Abad. An estimated 700,000 Kyrgyz citizens reportedly reside in Kazakhstan and Russia as labor migrants.

Economically, the collapse of the former Soviet Union brought about a sudden decline in living standards. As the Kyrgyz government's expenditures halved along with the Kyrgyz Gross Domestic Product, citizens witnessed a dramatic withdrawal of the State and a precipitous decline in social services during the post-Soviet period before economic growth began to restore some of the losses in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Politically, the country has struggled with a series of stalled reforms and fractionalized politics. Ethno-political divides have hardened and the State has become increasingly viewed as authoritarian, clientelistic, and corrupt. State security services have been used to suppress ethnic minorities, religious dissidents, and political opponents. These factors, coupled with a controversial privatization program, risky foreign policy pitting Russia against the United States (US), and spike in energy tariffs culminated in violent anti-government protests during the spring of 2010.

Following a series of smaller incidents in April 2010, clashes between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks (over 60 percent of who live in southern Kyrgyz Republic) erupted in Jalal-Abad in May 2010, leaving at least two people dead and 71 injured. The Jalal-Abad confrontation was a prelude to a full-blown ethnic conflict that engulfed southern Kyrgyz Republic in early June 2010. As the violence spread in the south, ethnic Uzbeks appeared to be a minority group under siege. According to official estimates, more than 400 people died and thousands were injured during the week-long unrest. According to UN data, 1,749 buildings were destroyed. The monetary cost from the violence was estimated by Kyrgyz officials at $500 million. The ethnic clashes also created a regional displacement crisis. The UN estimates that the conflict created close to 300,000, mostly Uzbek, Internally Displaced Persons and 75,000 refugees. The region was engulfed by a humanitarian disaster brought on by the disruption in the normal supply chains for food and other goods.

In the aftermath of the violence, the Kyrgyz Republic adopted a new constitution featuring a parliamentary republic. Stabilization of the political situation has mitigated some fears about immediate risks of major instability. Prior to the December 2011 presidential elections, many residents were concerned that electoral disputes between northern and southern political factions would spark a new wave of political unrest. A series of events in late 2011 and early 2012—the peaceful election of Almazbek Atambaev to presidency, the formation of a new

coalition government in Bishkek, and the peaceful conduction of municipal elections—have allayed some concerns in the short to medium time horizon.

The structural causes of instability include disputes among government branches over power delineation, regional divides, political exclusion of influential groups, and the persistence of patronage politics and corruption. These constrained the stabilization of the country and continue to undermine citizen trust across the country. The dynamics stemming from the drivers continue to pose a risk to the stability and peaceful development of the country.

Diffusion of political authority and decision-making power has opened up the potential for greater conflict, and potentially violence, among elites given the lack of a clear-cut arbiter to determine division of prerogatives and rents as in previous centralized presidential regimes in the country. Furthermore, citizens continue to be alienated both through the widely perceived patronage-based corruption that persists as well as the daily, transactional corruption which is an inextricable part of daily life from basic applications for government documents to access to basic social services. The possibility for mass popular protests (mobilized at the grassroots, by elite groups and the opposition or by rent-seeking interest groups) at local, regional, or national levels remains possible if alienation reaches a tipping point for any segment.

OTI's Response: Overview of KRTI

KRTI was designed to support the Kyrgyz Republic's political transition. The $33.1million, three and a half year program sought to leverage OTI's unique comparative advantages of providing quick-response and innovative programming. KRTI was implemented by IRG/Engility (hereafter referred to as IRG), a first time OTI implementer under the "Support Which Implements Fast Transitions III" (SWIFT III) indefinite quantity contract. Within weeks of OTI's arrival, ethnic violence erupted in the southern cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad, highlighting the need for targeted assistance to address emerging sources of instability within communities capable of derailing the nascent democratic transition. In response, IRG established a field office in Bishkek in May 2010, and following the events of June 2010, also established a field office in Osh to manage activities in the south focused on mitigating ethnic conflict and stimulating recovery.

Since December 2010, KRTI's overarching goal has been to support the Kyrgyz Republic's efforts to establish a more stable and secure democracy, while laying the groundwork for continued long-term development. KRTI adopted two strategic objectives aimed at providing targeted assistance in volatile and strategic communities:

1. Support the ongoing democratic political transition at the national and local levels, and

2. Address emerging sources of instability and conflict at the community level.

KRTI's program-level analysis of the root causes of conflict among communities and between the citizens and the government resulted in a number of programming "clusters." These form the basis of program-level M&E in KRTI.

- Stimulate economic recovery and expand opportunities in marginalized and volatile communities;

- Increase access to reliable information to inform citizen decision-making and reduce the impact of rumors;

- Promote interaction that encourages diversity, inclusiveness, and pluralism in formal and informal institutions;

- Strengthen the capacity of civil society to assess, prevent, mediate, and mitigate conflict;

- Expand opportunities for youth and other vulnerable populations to engage in constructive and productive activities at critical times; and

- Improve the responsiveness and accountability of government through inclusive decision-making and citizen engagement.

These clusters have evolved in response to the changing context but continue to reflect KRTI's general programming hypotheses. They were designed to help the team draw logical relationships and linkages between the individual activities and the program's strategic objectives. The emphasis on specific clusters has varied over time; clusters were modified and reduced from 12 at the beginning of the initiative to six in response to the recommendations of the May 2011 and January 2012 PPRs, and of the input from the April 2011 USG Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF). Overall, KRTI has worked to create a preponderance of activities and resulting outcomes that, when aggregated, can generate real impact and build a foundation on which government, civil society, and the international community can build on to create substantive change in the future.

Following the first annual SRS in October 2010, KRTI agreed on targeted geographic locations, resources allocation and identified future critical events in political, social and cultural spheres.

RAs, regular SRSs and PPRs allowed the program to effectively define its long-term program strategy and approach. KRTI used a wide range of analyses like ACTED Socioeconomic Mapping and Conflict Analysis of the southern Kyrgyz Republic, ICAF analysis, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Security Risks and Mitigating Strategies Assessment and USAID the Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Assessment to draw the most critical events, potential sources of instability, key conflict drivers, mitigating factors to contribute to the program strategy and activity development for every three to six months.

The first year of the program, KRTI supported the interim government to better its service delivery and build public confidence. After the June 2010 violence in the south, the program aimed at implementing quick-response activities as well as increasing citizen confidence in government and mitigating potential conflicts through small-scale projects like equipment provision to government, cash-for-work, and social infrastructure activities. KRTI was careful not to exacerbate tensions by focusing support solely on the ethnic Uzbek communities. The funding underpinned the strategic goals of the Department of State's assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia, which allocated $5 million. Additional funding came from the Complex Crisis Fund ($20.1 million) and USAID/Kyrgyz Republic Funds ($4.48 million).

Following the February 2011 RA, changes were recommended and implemented to improve the overall management and communication within the program. KRTI built the capacity of its staff and even recruited new people within the first year of its implementation. As OTI's general concept and mandate differs from other international donor organizations, it took some time for staff to understand its nature and overall programming logic.

In response to the changes in 2010, the State Directorate for Reconstruction and Development launched reconstruction in the south. KRTI supported activities such as public hearings on the

progress of reconstruction, restoring critical government functions, as well as infrastructure repair, increasing job skills through enhanced vocational training centers.

Unemployed and vulnerable youth of different ethnicities were perceived by KRTI as a critical mass that could influence the conflict during the anniversary of April and June 2010 events and the presidential election in October 2011. To prevent tensions, KRTI engaged youth in clean-up campaigns to prevent them from engaging in more destructive actions. KRTI also supported activities at youth centers and sports halls throughout the country.

In the spring of 2011, the interim government issued a decree about establishment of Public Advisory Boards (hereafter simply "Boards") under each ministry, state agencies, and local governments to encourage inclusivity and transparency when developing policies and making decisions. The formation of these bodies emerged as a unique opportunity for KRTI to support the ongoing democratic transition. The program implemented several activities to build the capacity and legitimacy of the members of newly established Boards including budgeting and legislation analysis.

KRTI was scheduled to end in May 2012, shortly after the anticipated date of the presidential election, as the possibility of violence was still high and there were no response mechanisms in place should violence erupt following OTI's departure. The extension of KRTI to December 2012 had been considered with additional funding allocation. Later, the program was extended a second time to December 2013 at the request of USAID and the US Embassy, enabling KRTI to emphasize governance aspects that influence the political transition.

In the fall of 2012, new local council elections took place in accordance with the proportional voting system. In response to a high demand for increasing the role of the local council members, a number of KRTI tools were initiated and implemented, including a management guidebook as well as other management manuals on a legal framework, a land code framework, and designing and reading local budgets. As a result, KRTI revised its program strategy and decided to limit youth and community engagement activities, in favor of national-level media, advocacy, and government accountability initiatives.

In the final year of programming, there was an increased focus on catalyzing longer-term development initiatives to address problems likely to threaten the ongoing transition, e.g. anti-corruption, human rights improvements, and destabilizing critical issues, including energy, mining and judiciary. To maximize program legacy and handover, KRTI was to transfer the existing knowledge, experience, and partners to two new USAID programs—CGP and GGPAS—as well as to other USG agencies through a variety of legacy products.

KRTI implemented 448 discrete projects, ranging from creating short-term jobs, and rehabilitating social and irrigation infrastructure, to projects that increase the responsiveness of government or promoted tolerance and diversity (see **Figure 1** below).

Figure 1: KRTI Grant Distribution by Sector

- Information & Communication
- Tolerance & Pluralism
- Productive Youth Activities
- Civic Engagement
- Responsive Governance

Over 234 local partners were engaged in the implementation of activities from government, civil society, and the private sector. The program mostly partnered with national NGOs and sub-national government institutions (see **Table 1** below).

Table 1: Number of Grants and Awardees According to Grantee Type (including cancelled)

Grantee Type	Number of Awardees	Number of Activities
National NGO	62	110
Sub National Government	51	69
Local NGO	37	58
Community Based Organization	28	29
Local Self Government	28	36
Educational Institution	24	25
National Government	24	38
Private Entity	17	41
International NGO	15	23
Media	10	17
Other	9	9
International Organizations	4	4
Total	**309**	**459**

KRTI cultivated local partner organizations with strong institutional and management capacity throughout the life of the program. It continued to work with those partners who showed most ownership, leading to repeated cycles of support and a close relationship with some. There are 76 awardees who received two or more grants from KRTI. Out of 76 awardees: 41 received grants two times; 17 received grants three times; and six received grants four times. Research Company "M-Vector", Public Fund Youth of Osh, Public Fund Abad, Eurasia Foundation in Central Asia, the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development, Interbilim, Civic Environmental Foundation "Unison" received grants more than five times (see **Figure 2** below).

Figure 2: KRTI Grantees Receiving 3+ Grants

Awardees that received 3+ grants

KRTI has taken a regionalized approach with slightly different areas of concentration in the north and south and on the national level (see **Figure 3** below).

Figure 3: Regional Distribution of Grants

KRTI supported nearly 127 activities[3] complemented by donor organizations such as the British Embassy, US Embassy, OSCE, the Soros Foundation, EC, and UN agencies such as UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF.

EVALUATION PURPOSE

KRTI has invested considerable resources into M&E over the nearly three and a half years of the program. Beyond the work done for the SRSs and the PPRs, it also commissioned extensive studies from local polling companies (SIAR, M-Vector), and independent case-study reviews which it collected in a separate document upon program closure.

It also pioneered the idea of a three stage evaluation which was designed to inform the program even before closure. In late April 2013, OTI contracted Social Impact (SI) and its partner, Channel Research, to conduct a final evaluation of KRTI. The evaluation aims to document and analyze KRTI's achievements and challenges, monitoring systems, and strategic approaches (see **Annex A** for the complete SOW).

This report presents the main findings starting from the contextual analysis, leading to case-studies and overall findings.

The evaluation established a work plan in June 2013 with:

- July 17 to July 27: first field visit.

- August 19 to September 12 second field visit: 18 case-studies identified and evaluated.

- November 4 to November 20: third field visit.

Each field visit corresponded to a specific analytical step for the evaluation.

1. The first step allowed the team to gain an understanding of the context in terms of **key contextual drivers and case-studies**. These were identified through consultations with respondents through focus groups (including a mixture of activity participants, beneficiaries, and transition stakeholders that may have been only remotely involved in the program).

2. The second field visit allowed the team to analyze the performance of the program **through case-studies**. Existing KRTI information was supplemented by direct observation of grant activities in different sites, and by targeted in-depth interviews.

3. The third step is the **synthesis of the case-studies and allied reports, such as surveys and evaluations,** and a presentation of the evaluation findings for validation or adjustment to a wide range of stakeholders.

The evaluation adopted a participatory approach which included OTI, the implementing partner, and local beneficiaries. These were actively involved in the elaboration of findings from the contextual analysis to the conclusions through the creation of nine Reference Groups. The information sources have been treated confidentially, but the findings have been presented in four successive meetings (with KRTI, at the US Embassy, and to OTI in Washington, DC).

---

[3] This number is based on an analysis of the database, where a word search of other organizations was carried out by the evaluation team.

METHODOLOGY

Evaluation Tools

The approach is based on an analysis of performance in relation to the context, primarily assessing how the interventions addressed key drivers and followed through on the program logic. It is based on the following analytical tools:

- **Events and Trends Mapping (Stage 1)**: a method used to capture the decisive conditions of the transition in the country, allowing for the identification of the points of interaction between the program activities and those drivers.

- **Case-studies (Stage 2):** these are groups of inter-related activities, where evidence is verifiably collected and cross-checked with KRTI. The outcomes are analyzed in terms of the eight evaluation questions and of the drivers of transition. The detailed findings are presented in **Annex B**.

- **Triangulation (Stage 3):** the findings were checked against other evaluative research carried out by KRTI or related partners. This is also the stage during which the findings were shared and discussed with key stakeholders.

The identification of key events or trends conducted during the Events and Trends Mapping undertaken during the first field visit were intended to complement the academic conflict analysis with a local layer, a form of reality check. This process can confirm the stability drivers identified from the academic research and add or refine other drivers. It can also give weight to certain transition drivers[4] and can also allow geographical differentiation—drivers perceived as relevant in one province can be of lesser importance in another. The case-studies were then conducted during the second field visit was used to analyze the way in which KRTI has indeed exercised, or failed to exercise, its influence. KRTI had inevitably achieved more success in some areas than others, and also concentrated on truly strategic aspects which would escape a cursory external analysis in the second stage. Understanding the clusters and the geographical grouping of interventions thus needed to be based on an informed understanding, which the team felt were best based on a set of individual case-studies selected on the basis of the drivers.

For the KRTI grants to achieve impact, they would need to be motivated by where the contextualized priorities are located—for example, the struggle over scarce resources in the case of water irrigation projects and the focus on the Fergana valley for these grants. The places where there has been a preponderance of activity were hence being aligned to the evolving drivers in the country, as defined by the local sources of information, and by KRTI analyses.

During their third field visit, the team completed their case-studies and triangulated some of their preliminary findings with other research studies conducted by KRTI and publically-available secondary sources. The team also shared some of these findings with relevant stakeholders to gain their feedback and identify points in need of further clarification.

It should be pointed out that the focus groups were also used as reference groups to discuss the findings of the evaluation. The composition of the focus groups was entirely guided by the evaluation team, including a purposeful sample of an equal proportion of the beneficiaries of the

---

[4] As was the case with "weakness of the state" that came out very strongly

activities, of government and civil society representatives which were not involved in the activities, and informed independent observers[5]. These were selected based on the networks of the evaluation team and the recommendations formulated by the KRTI field staff. The full list of participants is provided in **Annex D**, but it should be pointed out that the mapping methodology prevented group biases becoming too prevalent in setting the context (as it isolates stages in the identification of events and trends, their interconnections, and then the identification of their priority based on these interconnections).

Early on, the list of drivers and case-studies enabled the team to make sense of the multiple interactions which took place in a fast changing situation between local dynamics as well as around KRTI, and also to track how the local dynamics interacted with the KRTI grants. This allowed the team to avoid relying on large sets of empirical data about shifts in the general knowledge, attitudes, and behavior of the population.

KRTI commissioned four such perception surveys and collected data on success stories. These provided some limited additional evidence which the evaluation could rely on for its own conclusions. The limitations were the unpredictability of the type of change to be captured in the baselines, difficulty in isolating counterfactual evidence, and absence of candor of the respondents (the survey companies filmed all focus group and in-depth interviews which affected the quality of the findings)[6].

While such data sets are important and useful, the task of the evaluation was to make sense of the program in a strategic sense, and to draw out conclusions regarding its overall impact. This was done in relation to drivers of transition, which were listed during the first visit, then analyzed, and finally reported against through the case-studies in the second visit.

That list of drivers was prioritized on the basis of the feedback from participants as part of the first visit, during which the focus groups were held, leading to the creation of the Reference Groups. The aim of these Reference Groups was to anchor the consultations in an ongoing consultation, based on mutual familiarity. The ranking done in the course of the first field visit allowed the evaluation team to focus on a select few (not necessarily the top drivers, but those within the sphere of influence of KRTI).

LIMITATIONS

The evaluation was able to access a considerable amount of information, most notably the OTI database, the relevant portions of the OTI Anywhere Country Room where activity information is stored, KRTI consultant reports, and other independently commissioned KRTI reports. The three stage visit enabled an iterative process of case-study selection and exploration and the identification of key respondents at different stages of the implementation of the program. The team is confident that it has gained access to all the evidence required to respond to the evaluation questions with accurate and complete information.

That being said, the evaluation still faced two significant limitations:

---

[5] One notable exception was the focus group organized with KRTI staff in Bishkek.
[6] As argued in the subsequent analysis and recommendations, it would be better for these surveys to be framed first by a contextual mapping which identifies the drivers of transition. Once these have been isolated, the survey would be in a better position to pin-point the shifts in decisive conditions which can be attributed to the program.

- The evaluation took place over the last six months of the initiative (June 18 to December 2, if one takes the kick-off meeting and final debriefing as landmarks). This means that its contribution to the program did not inform either key programming decisions or the KRTI "legacy" preparations. The confidentiality of the tendering of follow-up programs (GGPAS and CG in particular) and the management burdens of close-out for IRG and its partners, to some extent limited the focus group consultations that could have taken place, such as with an evaluation society in the Kyrgyz Republic.

- The evaluation was not commissioned to look into management aspects of KRTI. These, particularly human resource issues, have been a decisive influence in the program, not least due to the flexibility which was required of staff by multiple and unpredicted extensions, and the difficulty in finding experienced personnel at initiation. These aspects are mostly covered in the present report from the angle of monitoring and assessment, reviewing the manner in which knowledge was developed and communicated. It should be recognized that the program was never designed as a single foresighted endeavor but rather the fruit of diverse, even at times conflicting, views. However, these have nevertheless allowed for the development of a well-articulated approach which allows the evaluation to speak of KRTI as a single and strategic initiative.

These limitations are not considered by the authors to have affected the validity of their findings. They represent instead a restriction of the scope of the evaluation, which, as a relatively expensive investment, could gain from being strategically connected to other reviews and assessments, a point raised in our findings and recommendations regarding M&E.

FINDINGS

STRATEGY

KRTI appears to be a highly strategic program that has tackled the main drivers of transition in the Kyrgyz Republic, as identified during the Events and Trends Mapping (see **Annex B**). It has combined a traditional OTI focus on community-level changes in attitudes and behavior with a novel emphasis given to governance.

OTI's comparative advantage was in placing the discrete targeted assistance on key actors, locations, and issues that emerged as sources of instability. The approach rested on the ability to assess the drivers of instability by relying on national staff skills and rapidly developing appropriate interventions to address those drivers based on a clearly formulated strategy adopted by senior management. The program was built upon the assumption that political transitions were unstable and fluid and therefore required constant reassessment and programmatic adjustments to retarget.

This has taken place against a backdrop of positive relations with the US Embassy and the USAID Mission. During the last phases of the program USAID has endeavored to replicate and propagate the results achieved by KRTI.

> **USAID/OTI's comparative advantages include:**
> - Speed of response and ability to react to fast changing circumstances;
> - Flexibility to adjust focus areas, methods and partners;
> - Cross-sectoral approach;
> - Augmentation, catalytic initiatives building on existing programs and past investments; and
> - Ability to operate field offices to expand perspective and impact.

KRTI adopted OTI's traditional but still appropriate venture-capitalist approach to programming, which allowed it to fan out widely across opportunities as they presented themselves. The strategic focus of the KRTI program then evolved substantially over time to respond to a volatile and swiftly changing political environment. In early April 2010, right after the overthrow of President Bakiev, OTI, at the requests of USAID Regional Mission and the country office and USAID's Asia Bureau, conducted an initial assessment and made recommendations on how to respond to the developing situation in the Kyrgyz Republic.

The team formulated an initial set of assumptions which have since been validated over the life of KRTI. The assessment identified and recommended targeted actors, geographic areas, and issues, such as at-risk-youth in urban and suburban areas, as well as engagement with local government. KRTI has sought to promote stability by proactively supporting democratic behavior, and to build public trust and confidence towards governance. KRTI was designed to assist a broad population in efforts to establish transparent, accountable, and effective government. Specific program objectives included:

- Increasing engagement and support disadvantaged populations by implementing small-scale community driven activities to enhance public services, engage youth, and quickly inject income and employment into marginalized communities.

- Enhancing strategic communication and messaging by assisting provisional government efforts to deliver critical government planning, programs, and policies. The program supported media and public forums that encouraged and expanded dialogue, and funded media activities that engaged youth and other potentially volatile groups; and

---

- Restoring critical government functions by providing technical assistance and equipment.

The June 2010 events created a new dynamic of civil unrest between groups, and in response, OTI quickly adapted its approach and took a leading role in mitigating ethnic conflict and restoring economic activity in Osh and surrounding regions.

Strategic Adaptation

Ultimately, the program was given a well-defined mandate to establish a more stable, secure democracy while laying the ground for continued long-term development. The program provided targeted assistance in volatile communities in order to:

1. Support the ongoing democratic political transition at the national and local level; and

2. Address emerging sources of instability and conflict at community level.

SRSs took place annually and provided an opportunity to review the continuing relevance of KRTI goals and objectives. The KRTI team went through a process of identifying critical events on the horizon and emerging sources of instability, re-prioritized target areas, partners, and approaches to the strategy. The KRTI held five SRSs over the life of the program, which informed strategy adaptations at each point in time. The SRSs were conducted in October 2010, June 2011, March 2012, October 2012, and April 2013.

In addition, PPRs reviewed the program at both the strategic and program levels and evaluated the relevance of the strategy and how it fed into overall country objectives. There were three PPRs during the life of the program: June 2011, January 2012, and October 2012.

Finally, KRTI conducted variety of RAs during which the team reviewed program-level assumptions and approaches. As during SRSs, this involved a process of identifying critical events and emerging sources of instability, and re-prioritizing target areas, partners, and approaches to the strategy. The team also helped to generate a list of targeted concepts of activities that were developed during the coming months. KRTI has completed a remarkable number of RAs and targeting exercises (February 2011, May 2011, September 2011, October 2011, December 2011, February 2012, April 2012, and June 2012) which explain the alignment of the program with its operating context. There was a Targeting Exercise in January 2013 in Bishkek and an All Programs Meeting in Osh in March 2013 to share a common understanding on the 2010 events and the KRTI-related programming in the south.

Challenges

Although the program was quick and comprehensive in the identification of its strategy, it encountered difficulties in communicating this strategy through the management chain down to the award partners and their own operational partners. The case-studies show a relative inflexibility in the delivery of the activities and a loss of synergy between activities, caused by difficulties in communication. The local partners often failed to grasp the breadth of the change being sought, leading to a certain loss of dynamism, and falling short of the strategic intent of KRTI's management. Some partners implementing related or interconnected activities were not well aware about each other's roles; for instance, the Talas BIS285 and BIS275 activities, "Strengthening a Local Government Monitoring Group in Talas" and "Increasing Dialogue between Talas City Council and Citizens," where partners saw each other as competitors rather than collaborators.

However, there were also many other examples of synergy and ability to attain a critical mass of changes to have an impact. For example, the February 2012 PPR cited the case of a conflict-mapping survey (BIS111), and a perception/attitudes survey (BIS109). The ACTED Country Director expressed his admiration for KRTI to undertake risky projects, which then allowed other donors to follow suit with over $10 million in additional funding (from the EU, UNHCR, and others). An unintended effect of program is that the KRTI mapping project is serving as a prototype for the OTI GIU's country program web mapping.

RELEVANCE

Figure 4: Events and Trends Mapping Exercise

The evaluation conducted Events and Trends Mapping sessions with nine different groups in Bishkek and throughout the country, and two with Bishkek and Osh KRTI staff. The process worked by eliciting key trends, then events, and then identifying the linkages between them (see Figure 4 right)

In Talas, many links, trends, and events interconnect relating to the April 2010 events, but vary in content. There are three central elements: the violence of 2010; the border and road events leading to economic issues; and the mining-youth central element of the context mapping that dominates the transition. As opposed to the mapping in Bishkek, the dynamics intensified in 2013. This coincides with the sense that the province is cut off from the center, and that the dynamics in Talas are purely local. These dynamics revolve around youth and are intensifying, indicating a possible new outcome. For this group at least, donors and USAID have a big influence.

In Toktogul, Jalalabad Oblast, there are three types of drivers: issues around the April revolution; justice and corruption tied to parliamentary politics ("120 dragons" in the colorful expression of one of the participants); and then international politics linked to foreign investment (Chinese and Russian in particular). The problems of loss of land and isolation are tied to the economic difficulties with a focus on youth emigration and criminality. There were a lot of reactions to youth emigration, large industrial projects (including Kumtor), and to corruption. Numerous small, but high profile events took place (arrest of the sons of MPs, bicentenary of the national hero Kurmanjan Datka). There were also numerous political statements about democracy, language, and international influence via aid agencies.

In Batken, focus group participants were primarily concerned with corruption, ethnic conflicts, and growing tensions between ethnic groups; also in addition, they highlighted dissatisfaction with and lack of trust in government as well as non-transparency in public fund management, privatization, and selling of the national estate. The focus group claimed that change in the government and power since 2010 has not led to any improvements in the above mentioned areas. Moreover, they noted that 2010 events caused a sharp decrease in foreign investment and business in the region.

Osh city representatives in the focus group were primarily concerned with increased ethnic conflicts and growing tensions between ethnic groups, which have turned to hidden intolerance and tensions. One of the critical issues, which contributes to the above conflict is that law enforcement, judiciary, and executive systems treat minority groups unequally and often with

huge bias. Another focus of discussion was on the issue of corruption, which has not improved since the change in government and power in 2010.

In Uzgen city, Osh Oblast, the discussion focused on the dissatisfaction with and lack of trust in government, fueled by nontransparent budgeting, resources use, and privatization of key businesses in the region. The participants were also concerned with the lack of independence of mass media, biased reporting, and control of mass media by power holders. Another central issue was increasing unemployment rates before and during the life of the program, due to lack of work places, low salaries, and benefits, which contributes greatly to increasing internal (within the Kyrgyz Republic) and external migration (labor migration to Russia and Kazakhstan). The question about the current condition of young people was also actively discussed. The feeling of anxiety and upcoming instability on a social level was experienced and reflected by each participant. "You can feel in the air that something is wrong," says one of the participants who opened this issue. Participants expressed their dissatisfaction that young people were neither involved in study nor in work, providing fertile ground for the mass protests that may easily turn into clashes. Youth have divided into ethnic groups as a result of growing nationalism. Another source of conflict according to program participants is related to religion and the growing number of religious extremists, e.g. graduates of *medrese*.

In Tokmok, Chuy Oblast, the central elements were the political crisis in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2010, as well as the new political and parliamentary system following from it. Comparing the "old" and the "new" system, participants could see some improvements, but saw many problems, such as corruption, remained at pre-revolution levels of frequency. Participants focused mainly on economic issues, such as youth unemployment and low salaries. During the revolution, a number of factories were closed in the region, due to unclear ownership and corruption, which increased the perceived economic hardship. In addition, religious intolerance was mentioned as an issue, as well as migration of ethnic Kyrgyz from Tajikistan to Chuy Oblast, but was not directly related to the political events in the Kyrgyz Republic. Interethnic relations in Tokmok were described as good and without problems. This was interpreted by the team as distorted, as apparently talking about ethnic divisions and problems, which is a regular concern in Tokmok, is a taboo, especially in front of donors and other foreigners.

In Bokonbaevo and elsewhere such as in Issyk-Kul Oblast, the three most prominent themes were the change of power in 2010, the level of corruption (which was clearly identified as decreasing), and the need to develop tourism further. Comparing the "old" and the "new" system, participants clearly saw improvements and the discussions focused on regular development issues, e.g. a need to increase the output of farming and agricultural processing. The introduction of a new salary system in the educational sector was seen as positive. The establishment and work of the local governing councils was also seen as positive; in contrast, participants responded critically to the work of the central government. In the economic sphere, the construction of new houses was mentioned as positive, but participants also agreed that overall low economic prospects in the region are responsible for youth unemployment and have led to an emigration of local youth, especially from rural areas.

The aggregation of all the drivers of transition can be found in **Table 2** below. The table demonstrates the ranking of drivers, where the numbers in the right hand column represent the number of forms of influence, or "centrality", of the driver:

Table 2: Focus Group Rankings of Key Transition Drivers

N	Trends & Events	Ranking
1	Ethnic conflicts, growing tensions between ethnic groups	75
2	Corruption	72
3	Poor and weak governance	71
4	Dissatisfaction with and lack of trust in government, nontransparent and often change of key-figures	60
5	Lack of actions from law-enforcement, weak judiciary and executive system	46
6	Control over and dependence of mass-media, biased reporting, limited freedom	42
7	Increased unemployment, particularly among youth (as the most relevant to a region)	40

As described in the methodology section, the scores assigned here are based on the mechanical counting of the "increases in probability" arrows indicated by focus group participants. As such they indicate an order of importance of the drivers, but are not a ranking of causality as such.

For its identification of key drivers, OTI used a number of studies and other sources that identified these drivers after the revolution in 2010. These include, but are not limited to:

- The **USAID/OTI Assessment and Design Report** (April 20-30, 2010) focused mainly on the transition phase immediately after the violence and revolution in April 2010 and identified crisis management, prevention of stagnation and backsliding, and post-election consolidation and support to a new democratically elected government as the main focus sectors. Based on that, the promotion of stability, support to democratic behavior, building of public confidence and trust and maintaining a positive momentum towards sustainable democratic governance were chosen as focus of OTI's work.

- The **Program Performance Review** (May 9-21, 2011) identified long-standing Kyrgyz-Uzbek rivalries especially in the Fergana valley, growing Kyrgyz nationalism, a cultural and economic north-south divide, as Islamic extremism, regional drug trade as well as a negative influences of a clan system were identified.

- The **ICAF Report "Focus on Southern Kyrgyz Republic"** (October 2011) identified ethnic and national identity issues, political instability, youth and radicalized women, a decline of trusted and traditional structures (like aksakals), a lack of strong state structures for justice and security, nationalist (language) politics and lack of sound minority politics, a discriminatory practice against a pluralistic practice of Islam and an insufficient management and lack of fair distribution of natural resources were identified as key drivers.

The team noted the considerable convergence between the drivers identified by the evaluation and those identified by KRTI, though the evaluation drivers tended to be more context specific. Further, analysis of the database and case-studies in terms of the thematic and geographical focus demonstrated that each time the program evolved it targeted the right issues, either in terms of sources of instability or in terms of attitudes towards the government. The opportunities were diverse as the context of the Kyrgyz Republic is much more open than many of OTI's operating environments, and this allowed the program to avail itself of all the resources it could.

Overall, the reviewed documents correspond to a large degree with the results of the mapping exercises, however, with the important difference that the mapping will allow the case-studies to relate to specific events or trends (for example the creation of a youth network in Talas Province to protest against mining), whereas a root cause approach remains too general to serve as an evaluation frame of reference.

ADAPTABILITY

The case-studies along with other studies commissioned independently by KRTI prior to the final evaluation demonstrate an interesting contrast. On the one hand the groups of activities carried out represent a good strategy of entry, identification of potential multiplier effects, and seizing of these effects to obtain a significant impact. This is particularly the case for the media component where KRTI can claim to have shifted the resource flows in favor of smaller independent companies such as Kloop Media and the rehabilitation of traffic lights in cities in the south. On the other hand, counter to OTI's operating assumption that achieving a preponderance of activity in certain geographic and thematic areas would result in greater overall impact, the activities of KRTI, particularly for social infrastructure and water infrastructure, seem relatively isolated in different communities. The surveys carried out show that popular attitudes are determined by a much wider number of variables than KRTI was able to influence, leading to a certain dilution of its influence when dealing with community-level change. KRTI contributed strongly to other aspects, in particular the visibility of US assistance among the communities. This is demonstrated in the M-Vector surveys commissioned by KRTI but also studies commissioned in the region by the State Department which show that US assistance featured systematically among the top three donors listed by the general population.

In early 2010 the program focused its activities on furthering democratic governance, long-term stability, and supporting efforts to establish transparent, accountable, and effective government. This was achieved by implementing small-scale community driven activities to enhance public services, engage youth, and quickly injecting income and employment into marginalized communities. The program also supported mass media and public forums that encouraged and expanded dialogue.

As the June 2010 events evolved the program quickly adapted its strategy to promote stability and reduce potential for conflicts at the national and community levels. KRTI provided small grants to implement short-term activities that encouraged and supported democratic behaviors and trust among citizens, civil society organizations, and the government. It effectively supported community driven activities that were addressing emerging sources of instability and helped to mitigate conflicts. It implemented activities that enhanced public services, engaged marginalized populations, and increased income and employment opportunities. It also supported small grants that tried to increase access to timely and reliable information for informed decision-making and mitigate the impact of rumors and information manipulation. OTI also provided technical assistance and funds to restore core government functions and responsibilities.

As events evolved the program continued to promote stability to reduce the potential for conflicts. By supporting collaborative short-term activities the program addressed conflicts between groups by responding to ongoing and emerging sources of instability and community discord. The program engaged marginalized and volatile communities to small-scale community driven infrastructure rehabilitation and short-term income and employment opportunities. OTI continued to support media initiatives to increase access to reliable information and expand

community dialogue. It also maintained its focus on supporting inclusive, responsive, and transparent governance at the national and local levels.

Of particular significance was the opening an office in Osh from early 2011, which allowed for a strong focus on the Kyrgyz part of the Fergana Valley, where in the aftermath of June events mutual antagonism, minor conflicts, insecurity, and fear prevailed. Appreciating the need for mitigating negative consequences, promoting tolerance, multiculturalism, and unity, a number of international organizations (including UNHCR, Danish Refugee Council, Act Alliance, UNDP, and Safer World) initiated projects in the south. KRTI was entering the region and had limited contacts and knowledge (preceding other USG initiatives in the region). The program effectively identified partners (such as Mercy Corps) already working in the field and provided finances to gain knowledge and experience necessary to penetrate the south. In the case of the Mercy Corps grants, KRTI did not have the contacts and local knowledge to be able to identify key actors and opportunities. It found a gap in the funding which UNHCR had been providing, and gained access to the benefits of years of programming.

There was however also a willingness to cover additional provinces, and to shift from inter-ethnic issues early on to more challenging and systemic issues of corruption and judiciary reform, always maintaining a good complementarity with other programs. The timing of the initiatives was well supported by the strong contextual analysis provided by local staff and partners. This demonstrates the adaptability of the program responding to a very diffuse situation. There is no single area which is the source of conflict, as there can be in Sri Lanka or in Nepal, and no specific group of actors to target. The program instead needed to extend to Talas, where the 2010 conflict was ignited due to indignation about mining, the conduct of local policemen, and the transparency of parliament. KRTI also approached media outlets from a number of angles in successive waves. A more focused approach would have risked having much more reduced impact.

USE OF ASSUMPTIONS

The case-studies demonstrate that the assumptions identified in the early assessments and continually revised through the RAs were well founded. These assumptions were clearly described in the database with a notable improvement in the formulation over time as the team became more familiar with the concepts.

However, these assumptions were in some cases under-emphasizing the risks, as in BIS 138, "Internet Portal to Enable Citizens to Engage with Parliament," implemented by the Civil Initiative on Internet Policy. The fact that only 30 percent of the population had access to internet means that the group of actual beneficiaries for this project was quite small. A considerable shift in political culture was required for it to reach its full potential due to the very different status which politicians used to play in society until then, often aloof and a source of unchallenged authority. In another example in the case-study covering BIS247, "Enhancing Accountability and Transparency in Government Spending," only 5 percent of participants had the capacity, knowledge, and skills to use the e-procurement.

At the same time the assumptions and more strategic thinking has not circulated well outside the immediate KRTI team. In the case of BIS285 in Talas Oblast, "Strengthening a Local Government Monitoring Group in Talas," there was an assumption that the local partners would understand an approach based on increasing transparency by supporting both the local authorities and a civil

society monitoring mechanism. In general, new city councils in the Kyrgyz Republic are represented by different political parties. The monitoring group in Talas should have clearly explained its role to each political party leader and the general members. Instead, it introduced itself to the city council head only. This resulted in it being suspected of being a rival political group. This stunted the achievement of its outcomes as the partners limited themselves to holding meetings using newly renovated rooms and furniture without more meaningful engagement being foreseen.

The highly political and complex implementation of the activities requires a strong understanding of the local partners, in particular the awardees. This ranges from administrative procedures which are easy for the partners to deal with (for example having clear timing and guidelines for the presentation of proposals) to a good relation of trust (for example not using the innovative ideas of one group to elicit a proposal based on these ideas from another, unrelated group).

The evaluation noted a high level of discontent among the partners after the end of the program (a time which makes them more open to voicing their views), particularly concerning KRTI's prolonged approval process, perceived discontinuities in the dialogue with partners, and narrow focus on what are primarily civil society coalitions.[7]

CAPACITY BUILDING

KRTI sought to support and strengthen the partners it funded based on an assumption that the most effective results would be achieved through a focus on the actors themselves, as well as on their actions. In other words, by strengthening a web of local authorities, NGOs, and media actors, a continued flow of positive influence would be gained, especially when these actors are themselves able to obtain funding from other sources. All the case-studies were unanimous on the significance and efficiency of this capacity building policy.

One of OTI's clusters refers to strengthening the capacity of civil society to assess, prevent, mediate, and mitigate conflicts. This can be explained by the notion that OTI operates through its partners working in the field who already have a capacity to implement projects of a particular interest to OTI.

Analysis of case-studies shows that well-established NGOs did not appreciate as highly as others OTI's capacity building efforts. They voiced frustration that OTI used them for achieving its own strategic objectives and that their organizations did not grow or develop as a result of participating in the program. They claimed that fee-for-service contracts used by OTI even depreciated their institutional capacity as their administrative, finance, and procurement staff were not engaged in the delivery of programs and lacked practical experience. They interpreted "capacity development" as provision of equipment for operational purposes.

There was greater interest in FOGs, which were introduced progressively in the program and were reportedly viewed by OTI as enhancing the decision-making opportunities of the awardees. These grants were in effect lump-sum arrangements where reporting was more technical than in traditional grants and included more milestones. This posed problems for some IRG staff in terms of fiscal policy and accounting but was promoted by IRG and OTI leadership and well-received by the partners who saw in it as a way of regaining ownership.

---

[7] See in particular Annex F Summary Minutes of the Reference Groups.

The team noted that there was a lack of consistency in OTI's decision-making regarding who and what kind of equipment to provide. The decisions were based on a PDO's and a GM's judgment. That said, the team noted an array of activities that contributed to building the capacity of its grantees at the individual, institutional, and systemic levels. OTI effectively identified trainings on conflict prevention, mitigation, and peacebuilding delivered by international organizations and pointed grantees to them. They gained necessary knowledge to conduct community based participatory appraisals to uncover and identify sources of instability and conflict drivers, and to tackle identified issues.

In terms of institution-building, OTI has significantly contributed to the growth of grantees' image, scope, and geography. Some NGOs have grown from a small village NGO and tremendously increased their geographical coverage up to the national level. Their image has grown so that they have become an example to others and their activities have been replicated in other regions of the republic. Some have even been recognized at the national level and were presented with awards. Infrastructure activities in the south have brought some positive unintended results, such as contributing to strengthened images of mayors in Osh, Jalal-Abad, and Uzgen cities, and increased trust to the government authorities.

At the systemic levels, the OTI program has helped to build linkages and networks of partners. CSOs and CBOs have been enabled to build productive relationships with government entities and gained experience of working with them.

IMPACT

The case-studies reviewed the impact of the activities on these drivers by covering three questions:

- **Relevance: Were the activities well connected to the driver?**

All activities included in the analysis directly relate to identified drivers of conflict, validating that KRTI effectively uncovered conflict drivers and designed targeted activities to tackle them.

However, the team noted that the "poor and weak governance" and "dissatisfaction with and lack of trust in government, nontransparent and often change of key-figures" drivers are closely interrelated so the activities addressing one or the other driver could be classified to either.

Of note, 80 percent of the case-studies scored above average on a scale of five, where a score of three would have been satisfactory. This conveys the ability of the activities to develop good points of interaction with the key drivers in the regions where they were implemented.

- **Extent: what proportion of the target population was covered, where the target population is defined for a whole Oblast?**

Analysis of the case-studies revealed only moderate coverage of the population by grant activities. This could be explained by the fact that KRTI used targeted and limited interventions. In addition to it broader infrastructure activities in the south, KRTI was targeting ethnic minorities using Kyrgyz and Russian through community meetings, print materials, or mass media. This allowed KRTI to reach some limited but important audiences, including ethnic minorities. However, the dissemination of some printed information material was limited due to an incorrect calculation of needs and the complicated OTI approval process, combined with time pressure.

OTI relied heavily on web-based information campaigns, which is not very effective due to low levels of internet connectivity and use in rural areas of the Kyrgyz Republic.

- **Duration: were the activities timely, were they repeated often enough, were they sustainable?**

The team's analysis suggests only slightly above average performance of OTI grants. KRTI activities were traditional in that they supported short-term targeted activities with the aim of bringing about positive change. While OTI successfully and effectively identified areas of focus at the national and local levels, and delivered activities in timely manner, it failed to achieve synergies. Activities were in many instances not interconnected, with the exception of when a series of activities were implemented by one grantee. KRTI was not been consistent in its approach to securing a maximum longevity for the influence exercised by its grants. They varied from one month to 10-11 months. Some activities requiring longer implementation periods were cut into different contracts but then had to be extended due to delays in approval and delivery of necessary products from OTI side.

As a result there are common strengths and weaknesses across the programming. The overall impact score card is the following:

Table 3: Impact Score Card Results

Case-studies	Relevance	Extent	Duration	Total score
1	5	2	3	10
2	2	2	4	8
3	5	4	4	13
4	5	5	4	14
5	5	4	3	12
6	5	4	4	13
7	5	5	4	14
8	5	4	4	13
9	5	5	2	12
10	5	5	5	15
11	5	3	3	11
12	4	2	3	9
13	5	4	4	13
14	5	2	4	11
15	5	5	5	15
16	5	4	5	14
17	2	2	4	8
18	5	5	2	12
	83	67	67	
Average	4.6	3.7	3.7	**12.1**

The scores are based on a combination of judgment criteria under each main aspect (relevance, extent and duration). These are added to assess their position under a scale of 15 points to avoid

the distortion which multiplication would create (as the gap between scores increase with the increase in the level of the score).

Distinctions between the clusters are harder to trace due to the fact that different activities, responding to a particular driver, could actually be related to various clusters. This is striking to see in the table below, when one remembers that each case-study was selected in relation to a particular driver:

Table 4: Correlations between Case-study and KRTI Clusters

Case-study #	Activity	Corresponding Clusters
1	BIS138	None
2	BIS196	1,2
3	BIS207	2,6
4	BIS247	2,4,6
5	BIS285	6
6	OSH050	1,3,5,6
7	OSH141	2,6
8	BIS140	1,3,5,6
9	BIS233	none
10	BIS298	6
11	OSH167	2,6
12	OSH191	6
13	BIS110	3,4,5,6
14	BIS204	5,6
15	OSH122	2,6
16	OSH221	6
17	OSH231	2
18	OSH148	3

The information can be teased out however by capturing the scores of case-studies that cut across different clusters. The scores compare in the following way:

Table 5: Case-study Score across Clusters

Case-study	Cluster 1 (economic)	Cluster 2 (informant°)	Cluster 3 (inclusive)	Cluster 4 (capacity)	Cluster 5 (youth)	Cluster 6 (account)	none
1							10
2	8	8					
3		13				13	
4		14		14		14	
5						12	
6	13		13		13	13	
7		14				14	

8	13		13		13	13	
9							12
10						15	
11		11				11	
12						9	
13			13	13	13	13	
14					11	11	
15		15				15	
16						14	
17		8					
18			12				
Average	**11.3**	**11.9**	**12.8**	**13.5**	**12.5**	**12.8**	**11**

While there was considerably greater emphasis given to the accountability cluster in the case-studies due to the drivers of transition selected, the average performance across the clusters is roughly the same with a slightly higher level in strengthening the capacity of civil society.

CLUSTERS

Program clusters form the basis for the program level analysis and the backbone of the M&E for KRTI. They are seen roughly as intermediate results formulated from the program assumptions and hypotheses that help KRTI draw a logical relationship between the activities and KRTI's strategic objectives. They are in effect "solutions" to problem hypotheses formed by Senior Management Team.

The first set of twelve clusters was developed and added into the database during February 2011 RA and included:

1. Improve responsive and inclusive governance through community decision-making
2. Improve capacity of government to deliver services more effectively and efficiently
3. Improve confidence in and relevance of local government
4. Improve confidence in government through better strategic communication
5. Improve confidence in government through increased access to better services and infrastructure in marginalized and volatile communities
6. Encourage citizen engagement in democratic processes
7. Increase access to reliable information in marginalized communities to inform citizen decision-making
8. Stimulate economic recovery and expand economic opportunities in marginalized and volatile communities
9. Increase access to reliable information to reduce the negative impact of rumors in volatile communities

10. Encourage activities that support agents of peaceful change in communities

11. Encourage activities and dialogues to reduce ethnic tensions and promote respect for pluralism and tolerance

12. Engage youth in volatile communities in constructive and productive activities at critical times.

Subsequently, as the situation in the Kyrgyz Republic evolved the KRTI team reviewed the program assumptions identified during February 2011 RA and with findings of October 2011 ICAF and May 2011 PPR. Once the program assumptions were revisited and articulated the SMT and staff was able to identify and formulate eight revised clusters. The program clusters as of SRS June 2011 included:

1. Stimulate economic recovery and expand opportunities in marginalized and volatile communities

2. Increase access to reliable information to inform citizen decision-making and reduce the impact of rumors

3. Encourage diversity, inclusiveness, and pluralism in formal and informal institutions

4. Strengthen the capacity of civil society to assess, prevent, mediate, and mitigate conflict

5. Expand opportunities for youth to engage in constructive and productive activities at critical times

6. Improve the responsiveness and accountability of government through inclusive decision-making and citizen engagement

7. Increase citizen confidence in government through expanded access to better services and infrastructure

8. Magnify the positive impact of governmental and non-governmental initiatives through improved strategic communication.

Immediately after February 2012 PPR, KRTI initiated its first Cluster Analysis, which informed January 2012 PPR further clusters modification. The final six program clusters are:

1. Stimulate economic recovery and expand opportunities in marginalized and volatile communities

2. Increase access to reliable information to inform citizen decision-making and reduce the impact of rumors

3. Promote interaction that encourages diversity, inclusiveness, and pluralism in formal and informal institutions

4. Strengthen the capacity of civil society to assess, prevent, mediate, and mitigate conflict

5. Expand opportunities for youth and other vulnerable groups to engage in constructive and productive activities at critical times

6. Improve the responsiveness and accountability of government through inclusive decision-making and citizen engagement.

The clusters are tools to help PDOs target a particular activity and its intended outcomes. During the design of each activity, PDOs identified at least one cluster as an area of programming that the activity is intended to address. This aggregation of activities and their specific outcomes was designed to serve as a tool for assessing the overall impact of the program. However, the evaluation did not find the use of the clusters to be useful as activities were frequently assigned to one or more clusters and always within the clusters, but with no ability to provide a verifiable basis of evidence to describe how much impact they achieved within these clusters. The team has not seen a comprehensive analysis of program clusters or any reports on assessment of overall program impact using clusters.

While the clusters allowed the program designers to think through the assumptions made when choosing grants and hence reinforced the strategic coherence of the overall thrust, the team did not find evidence that they provided significant guidance for M&E.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Efficient and accurate M&E systems are critical to the success of OTI programming, enabling OTI to constantly learn and readjust to best achieve its objectives in the context of its intervention.

KRTI adopted a three-tiered approach to design, monitor, and evaluate its program: strategic, program, and activity levels. KRTI has effectively managed its M&E efforts at the strategic and program level. At strategic level, KRTI conducted the Initial Country Assessment, SRSs and PPRs, which informed specific overarching country objectives. At the program level, KRTI conducted program assessment to determine strategy, initial assumptions, and programmatic approach. KRTI has also regularly reviewed and updated program level assumptions through RAs, SRSs, and PPRs, and conducted a variety of quantitative and qualitative research initiatives to feed into program analysis and help formulate a number of specific programming clusters.

At the activity level, M&E analysis influenced grant design, implementation, and evaluation. It was undertaken during the development of each individual activity and was based on assumptions about the intended outcomes. KRTI devised a number of tools or processes for conducting activity level M&E, starting from an activity development through implementation and closure.

The strategic and program level M&E efforts were remarkable in their scope but were limited by delays encountered in launching them and, on occasion, in the difficulty in phrasing research questions that would have informed the design in a unified way across the life of the initiative. The M&E efforts were not fully integrated into the design work given that they were mostly handled by senior management and visiting experts. They were also not well related to the SRSs, PPRs, and RAs which are the key points during which evaluative thinking can take place.

At the activity level, KRTI staff has been effective in designing innovative activities that reflect the dynamic context of the program and are in-line with KRTI strategic objectives and clusters. The summary/justification section of the database provided details on concrete deliverables or outputs of an activity, listed specific outcomes of the activity, and demonstrated how the grant relates to the overall program objectives and the progress it will make toward greater impact.

KRTI developed a whole list of activity level outputs recorded for each activity as a means of documenting and reporting quantitative data. KRTI also tracked a certain number of "F Indicators" which corresponded with overarching USAID objectives. Each activity was intended to have its own M&E plan; however, the evaluation was not able to find such M&E plans during

its case-studies.

Throughout the life of a project all members of KRTI team participated in routine activity monitoring through field visits, public events, and regular meetings with local partners and stakeholders. Changes to the activity design, lessons learned, and observations were regularly and successfully documented in the activity notes. The internal activity reporting did not succeed in capturing the intended and unintended effects of the activities, tending instead to remain highly attuned to process, inputs, and outputs.

It was assumed that activity evaluations would analyze, synthesize, and summarize all outputs and outcomes and lessons learned. The evaluation activities conducted by KRTI staff were limited in their scope and magnitude. The evaluations were limited to answering three questions:

A. Were the primary outputs of this activity achieved? If not, then why?

B. What was the major outcome or effect of this activity? Identify the major changes in attitude, perceptions or behavior. How do you know? What is your qualitative evidence and means of verification?

   a. Primary changes/effects/outcomes?

   b. Secondary changes/effects/outcomes?

C. What are the major lessons learned or recommendations for future projects?

Answers to these questions tended to rely on the professional judgment and interpretation of a GM and/or PDO. The absence of baseline data, which may be fully justified considering the breadth of the activities, made it difficult to measure outcomes and results achieved by activities.

Interviews with grantees revealed that KRTI was perceived to be particularly interested in processes, inputs and outputs, but failed to grasp outcomes. Moreover, no unified reporting requirements were used for grantee reports. Interviews with PDOs and GMs confirmed that they felt that they possessed limited M&E capacity and had no time to conduct proper activity evaluations due to a large number of grants to be managed at the same time.

TRIANGULATION WITH OTHER KRTI STUDIES

The evaluation was able to draw on the reports of a number of other independent evaluative studies carried out by KRTI, in particular those contained in the documents titled: "Case-studies: KRTI 2010-2013" which were produced by a number of independent authors, as well as reports titled "Assessing the Impact on Rehabilitation of Social Infrastructure" and "Assessing the Impact of Canal Rehabilitation Activities in the Southern Kyrgyz Republic", both by M-Vector. The evaluation also called on "Community Perception Research: Findings from focus groups in the Kyrgyz Republic" by SIAR Research & Consulting. There are also some important evaluation findings in four RAs, four SRS and three PPRs.

In the fall of 2010, KRTI initiated a number of research activities that were designed against its strategic objectives and programmatic clusters. One of these activities was BIS109 "Informing Program Decision-Making through Use of Community Perception Analysis" by SIAR. The survey provided qualitative analysis of public perceptions of political, social, and economic problems faced by residents from 18 targeted communities; and public perceptions of government responses to the needs of residents from 18 communities.

The RA of February 2011 states that the perception study was to be synthesized with the desk review research done by ACTED. However, the data could not be used as a baseline for the initial program activities. It had identified geographic locations, actors, and partners to work with. It showed that in the south citizens suffered from the June 2010 events. Citizens' values and priorities changed rapidly and dramatically. To address these issues KRTI focused on communities in Osh and Jalal-Abad provinces. Initially KRTI supported national level activities providing equipment to the key institutions like State Directorate for Reconstruction and Development, the President's office, and the Parliament. Later, KRTI continued its activities in the regions focusing on the rehabilitation and social infrastructure which were crucial for public safety and access to services especially in Osh and Jalal-Abad provinces.

KRTI tried to build confidence through rebuilding public spaces, repair, and rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure, for instance, KRTI supported 98 public infrastructure activities[8] in the entire country and repaired 31 different irrigation systems in Osh and Jalal-Abad provinces. According to M-Vector's research 35-48 percent of respondents in the south noted that infrastructure activities improved transparency, responsiveness, interaction, and dialogue between government representatives and communities. In Osh, for instance, rehabilitation projects significantly contributed to increase in trust to Osh Mayor. This means that KRTI intentionally did not publicize its work to change citizens' attitude towards the local authorities/government institutions in order to increase the sense of ownership of the government on the local level.

In the north, except for the case of Talas which the team visited twice, KRTI projects did not contribute to higher confidence on the part of the communities towards local authorities. Despite the fact that KRTI implemented social infrastructure projects equally in all regions, the perception

---

[8] Electricity rehabilitations (7), schools and orphanages (9), street and traffic light projects (11), youth and cultural centers, sports complexes (15), government offices (18), community parks and sports fields (85).

of the citizens to the local government in the north and in south remained different. These differences are not explained by the studies but could probably be due to different political cultures and experience of the April and June events of 2010. Quite remarkably the studies, including the case-study done on this topic and the present evaluation, show that the installation of street lighting and traffic lights improved local security and traffic safety and had a multiplier effect on aspects such as reducing corruption by police.

KRTI's underlying assumption for its irrigation infrastructure projects was that by rehabilitating the irrigation canals the program significantly contributed to improvement of delivery and management of irrigation system/canals, reduced tensions between ethnic groups, and increased economic benefits of citizens. KRTI as well as M-Vector research concentrated at outcome level rather than on impact. Irrigation projects by its nature require constant work and sustainability that should be fulfilled by either water departments or water users associations. The short-term results achieved by the program are good, but not sufficient as systemic as a more systematic approach should be used to influence the changes in a) increase of economic constituent and b) improvement of management of irrigation system and as consequences mitigate conflicts over the water resources.

The M-Vector research shows that infrastructure for irrigation played a clear role in bringing people together, improving ethnic relations, and contributing to friendly relations. Other such activities include projects related to sporting events, park restoration, and stadium construction, and some irrigation activities taking place at sensitive times around the anniversaries of critical events. However, these were relative short-term or one-time effects. The reports note that these outcomes could have been reinforced by other activities and rendered more durable. It was, for example, possible to implement several activities in the same conflict-prone communities to reinforce the gains[9].

The case-study on "Supporting Judicial Selection" states that the way in which KRTI supported lesser known NGOs was an effective way of gaining access into the government, focusing on highly active agents of change. Another study on inclusive and transparent local governance emphasized the importance of follow-on activities with local partners, as the learning curve ensured that they became more effective over time. They should also be encouraged to sign Memoranda of Understanding with local government.

All the studies noted the importance of two significant assets developed by KRTI: (1) relationships built over time with particularly charismatic and able individuals, (2) and the use of collected evidence analyzed in a systematic way to enable civil society and the private sector to shift relations of power. These levers were extensively used by KRTI, and would need to be integrated into follow-up programs by other funding sources. Since a large number of the professional staff from KRTI has now moved on to other programs in the country, in particular GGPAS, there is a high probability that this recommendation will be implemented. It is however important to note that KRTI, and OTI in general, do not use stakeholder mapping as a way of monitoring progress and influence, and the names of the individuals mentioned in the case-studies were not easy to find in the activity database.

---

[9] Many of these projects were taken on to complement the work done by other donors, which often made it hard to measure the overall success of these larger initiatives.

CONCLUSIONS

Whereas the implementation of the program was affected by a large number of staff on short term deployment, and the lack of prior experience with OTI programming, the actual delivery presents a unified and consistent performance. While there has been an evolution in the content of the program, this mostly reflects the evolution of the situation in the country rather than a correction of possible weaknesses.

The ability of KRTI staff to understand the variety of local situations and to fit into the institutional landscape should be commended. The priority given by KRTI's management to working closely with the Embassy and USAID Mission paid off with a complementarity in programs (for example in the minerals mining sector where USAID provided the bulk of the resources), and political support for the program. It is frequently the case around the world that USAID follow-up programs lag behind OTI initiatives, leading to a loss of the investments made, in particular in terms of staff and of expertise. This was not the case here.

The program did not provide a clear strategic thrust and operated widely across the country, which could lead to the conclusion that it lacked focus. Governance was a clear focus, especially at the national level. The larger number of grants went to governance (150 grants; more than double the closest other sector), while the government was the most significant beneficiary of all the grants (110; grants the same number as the national NGOs). This was aligned with the need to bolster the credibility and engagement of the State with its citizens, but does not provide a clear picture in terms of sectors or levels of government.

However, a conclusion saying that there was a lack in focus would be mistaken. Instead, the key drivers were identified and convergent funding streams were used to create multiplier effects around these. For example, a concern about the transparency of local government attracted funding for public hearings for both the local authorities and civil society which was amenable to work on that issue. The lack of independence and reliability of media in the Kyrgyz Republic was met with waves of research on audience behaviour, which allowed the media outlets to understand how their programming decisions affected their ratings. This then shifted the way in which advertisers funded specific private outlets, creating a shock among large public media which had in the past been in a position of monopoly. It reduced the possibility for political manipulation by increasing the profile and also the autonomy of smaller outlets.

A weakness in the program was its interface with the local partners, particularly contractors and grantees with more limited capacity to implement projects in-kind or to handle cash grants, in a tight timeframe. The underlying assumptions that the program was making (in particular about the access of the general public to the internet or to mobile applications) were not shared by the local partners, who found themselves obliged to implement activities they did not fully understand or agree to. In some cases they felt that they had been misguided as funding was announced and then withdrawn, priorities shifted, and their programming innovations were assimilated by KRTI and shared with other implementing bodies as their own ideas.

Such limitations in the engagement with partners comes from the mode of operation which used to a limited degree repeat funding allocated to the same partners (the five most sustained recipients obtained six to eight successive grants over three years, with implementation typically taking four months). There is also an emphasis on in-kind contributions and centralized

procurement, which is not familiar to most actors. The significant time required to manage the administrative aspects of the transactions limited the ability of KRTI GMs to spend time in the communities or with stakeholders (while PDOs were required to disengage at that point and were not available), creating a barrier between them and the diverse terrain they operated in.

Internal difficulties in communicating intent between IRG and beneficiaries resulted from the difficulty of getting program concepts through the complex and time-consuming approval process. This meant that by the time a grant was approved for implementation, the original intent (opportunities, people) may have changed. The PDOs had no incentive to be vigilant about the successful implementation of projects they brought to the table, other than their personal professional standards and expectations, and they were stretched in the amount of time they could dedicate to specific initiatives. The fact that the PDOs and GMs were generalists, meaning they did not come to KRTI with the skills or experiences for creating projects in any particular field, was a constraint in more technical fields which could be balanced by a closer integration of the STTA. In the media work there was limited in-house capacity to advise the partners on questions or problems that might arise. This affected projects such as the one by EREP which performed to a lower level than it could have potentially done (see the EREP case-study in **Annex F**). With more support from STTA personnel the difficulties could have been overcome.

Multiple and long running monitoring assessments and technical support missions provided KRTI with considerable opportunities to overcome such gaps. These included not just the present evaluation and the case-studies commissioned at the end of the program or the surveys and polling carried out in various sectors by professional organizations such as SIAR or M-Vector. The extensive assessments should also be seen to encompass the PPR, management reviews, and SRS which assist most OTI initiatives in maintaining close contact with more strategic thinking and OTI's broader policies. A number of STTA deployments also took place, as well as specialist consultancies, in particular in the media sector.

It was significant to note how many these initiatives were taking place in parallel, and how much of the information did not inform other assessments. While the evaluation itself was given the results of these assessments, they often did not connect with other assessments other than with the M&E fields contained in the database. This latter element was often much more about progress in terms of outputs than about impact, with a few exceptions.

While the program invested heavily to generate a considerable potential for heightened awareness, and used centrally the knowledge produced by these assessments to ensure relevance and timing of its interventions, it did not connect with the debates going on among the partners, for example by involving them in the design. It was not able to define an impact monitoring system. The careful design of the interventions into clusters remained relatively inexpressive in terms of the overall contribution to the changes in the country.

In spite of the reservations note above, the KRTI contribution was notable in the country for its speed and strategic impact, and provided full value for money. It is important to give credit to the extremely hard working and disciplined team that worked on achieving such a result. It is also important to recognize that the current state of diffuse fragility that characterizes the country today would be greater had there not been KRTI.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The mode of operation in OTI is essentially about corporate culture using a large dose of tacit knowledge. KRTI has shown that hiring the right people and ensuring continuity is important to secure this—as important as blending into the context, which OTI does well and within which it is able to operate strategically. The broader OTI should continue to focus on personnel as a key resource, particularly developing a pool of "anchor-people" such as in OTI's "Bull Pen," and through other STTA resources.

2. There should be a clearer formulation of the roles of different teams engaging in M&E, such as those deployed for STTA, SRSs, PPRs, RAs, and surveys. While KRTI deployed considerably more resources for this than other OTI programs, it highlighted the need for stronger inter-connections between the different types of assessments. OTI should think about creating one or two roving evaluation specialists (who would not be given operational tasks), who could link existing assessment tools and those which KRTI has designed, such as case-studies or surveys. This role could include training for the PDOs and GMs to strengthen their ability to analyze the performance of their activities in relation to the context, not just in relation to the individual activity fields of the database.

3. This evaluation capacity should rely on an objective and situational frame of reference but remains rooted in some constants within the environment. This will provide a frame against which the activities can be assessed for impact, in the absence of experimental or baseline evidence. The points of reference should be context drivers (defined as types of events and trends, rather than causes or clusters) which are decisive conditions which OTI must affect to be able to claim to have an impact on the broader transition.

4. The progress that OTI is making in defining its ToCs and clusters should be introduced into the database, possibly using fields with a more visual representation, to present the logic within and between the clusters. This should contain not just the vertical linkages to overall issues (ideally drivers), but also horizontal linkages between a succession of activities where there is a strategic progression. The important practice of linking grants together into sequences that represent entry, follow-up, maximum impact and then hand-over, should be better captured and analyzed. The existing GIU mapping could be expanded to deliver such analysis.

5. The use of STTA to tap into specific forms of technical knowledge is a model that should be used in other countries. It should include strong feedback loops for the overall strategy and be focused on findings that are directly useful for programming.

6. The PDOs and GMs should be assessed on a broader range of metrics: the numbers of activities funded, the quality of delivery and tracking of outputs, but also the ability to engage in strategic dialogue with local partners and to obtain endorsement of the KRTI strategy by those partners. This could translate into new initiatives that will correspond even better to KRTI's strategic intent and to the local partners' advantage.

LESSONS LEARNED

The program was innovative in its ability to identify and target localized drivers of change in a highly complex and diffuse transition. It did so with the support of a large array of analytical inputs. The strengths extend to how the activities were implemented, using a strong intentional and beneficiary selection/re-inclusion. The post-OTI involvement (handover strategies) replicate concepts from different geographic areas while ensuring that practice responds to local needs. The focus on empowering the partners to continue to address the perceived needs is also worth capturing.

Activities supported by KRTI have been very innovative in nature and ranged from the use of IT, Internet based technologies to improve governance and built trust to using arts as a mean to mitigate conflicts and promote tolerance, inclusiveness, diversity and pluralism.

OTI has to consider the following lessons learnt for future programming of its activities elsewhere in the world:

- Analysis of an activity context: KRTI and its partners should have dedicated more time to undertaking a comprehensive analysis of the outer environment the grants to be implemented in parallel with implementation (care must be taken not to slow things down by carrying out preliminary assessments). Moreover, grants missed mapping and analysis of stakeholders. This resulted in exclusion of some major stakeholders for OSH191 and OSH167 leaving the issues unresolved and failing to bring about systemic changes.

- Risk/unintended results analysis: KRTI and its partners should pay considerable attention to risk and unintended results analysis to avoid possible negative effects of their activities. For example activity OSH231, by delivering only news headlines, created premises for a wider spread of rumors and unintended out-of-pocket expenditures for those who wanted to read the news in full and had to use mobile Internet. Moreover, fee for service contracting mechanism used by KRTI resulted in resignation of several employees of Kloop Media due to the fact that the organization could not continue to compensate its employees on the KRTI's pay level.

- Sustainability: KRTI has created preponderance of activities by implementing catalytic grants, which establish precedents for activities to bring about positive change.

- Program management: KRTI program management needs further enhancement in terms of communication with grantees. The evaluation witnessed numerous complaints from grantees when project proposals and budgets were changed without prior negotiation and agreement with grantees. Decision on changes were made on KRTI management level and imposed to grantees. Moreover, OTI could develop in its programs detailed criteria for provision of equipment to grantees. This has always been based on subjective judgment and discretion of a PDO.

- Cluster analysis: OTI should heavily use its database to conduct cluster analysis which will not only provide information on the swarm of activities but also could help in connecting individual activities in different regions to strengthen and complement each other.

- Language: The evaluation has discovered that a number of activities used Kyrgyz and Russian language for the production of information, communication and education

materials to be used and disseminated, in areas where comprehension of these languages was limited. Thus considerable attention should be paid to the language of materials to be produced in order to achieve intended results and impact.

ANNEXES

Annex A: Scope of Work

Annex B: Additional Information on Context Analysis

Annex C: Results from Events and Trends Mapping Exercise

Annex D: List of People Met

Annex E: Bibliography

Annex F: Summary Minutes of Final Reference Groups

Annex G: KRTI Evaluation Case Studies (Volume II)

ANNEX A: SCOPE OF WORK

Evaluation Design and Approach

The **purpose of the evaluation** will thus be to see how well the program was able to adapt to windows of opportunity within the democratic transition at the national and local levels, as well as emergent sources of instability.

Evaluation Challenges

The country is affected by a multitude of factors of instability, which have been gathered by OTI into analytical categories. The weight to be given to the different factors is, however, difficult to estimate and their links to the clusters are also hard to establish at a high level of generalization.

Over and beyond the evolutionary nature of OTI programming, there are many cross-cutting factors affecting tensions in the country. This means that there will probably not be any observable trend that can be completely attributed to a particular KRTI cluster. It is exceedingly difficult to establish a diagram with the logic of intervention (including grants, approaches, cluster objectives and overall objectives, for example, to use the KRTI program terms) and its wide geographical spread in order to accurately test the value of an OTI approach in relation to other donor approaches due to the significant assumptions made between the different levels.

Proposed Solution

Our proposed Evaluation Plan is based on a non-traditional, **context based approach** designed to best capture the unique comparative advantages that OTI brings to USG foreign assistance in the Kyrgyz Republic. It deviates from traditional approaches focused on assessing theories of change and logics of intervention to focusing on understanding how well the KRTI program was able to respond, and adapt, to windows of opportunity within the democratic transition at the national and local levels, as well as emergent sources of instability as stated in the evaluation purpose above. It will be based on a strong contextual understanding and a bottom up approach, and will look to assess KRTI's effectiveness along each of OTI's three level of analysis (the strategic, programmatic, and activity level).

Methodology and Sequencing of Evaluation Activities

Our approach first seeks to understand the context, then assesses the programmatic clusters' relevance to the context, and finally identifies how the interventions fit within both the context and program clusters.

The building blocks of the evaluation are the following analytical tools:

- Transition mapping, also called Events and Trends mapping: this is a method used to capture the essential elements of a complex situation to assess impact. It can be used to analyze a very local problem (for example a mining project) or a national one (natural resource governance) or a broad political transition in the country. It was used in the Nepal OTI country program evaluation solely at the national level, for example.

- Case-studies: these are bounded aspects of the program delivery where evidence will be verifiably collected, and which will allow the aggregation of qualitative information. The case-studies are generally geographically defined (for example an area of Jalalabad) or institutionally defined (for example independent media). The case-studies will include those that are being carried out by KRTI, as well as new ones selected by the team to cover clusters that may not have been fully covered.

- Analysis of the outcomes: these are defined as the uptake of the activities or grants, as observed within the case-studies. This seems to the team to be an important aspect of OTI programming

as the key aspects of the programs are often not the outputs themselves but the direct or indirect reaction of the target groups (people or institutions) to the activity itself. They help capture the process and its effects as much as the end result.

As such, our evaluation uses an iterative approach that builds on the information and findings from each phase of the evaluation:

- In **Phase 1**: elaborating a **participatory mapping of transition drivers** (using an Events and Trends Mapping technique) with select expert groups and populations (whereby the communities are the experts in their own transition); providing local and national level stakeholders an opportunity to speak to changes in the context that have occurred over time (and their explanations for why); analyzing whether any identified drivers were within the sphere of influence of KRTI; and finally analyzing the geographical catchment areas where the drivers are most present. This will conclude with the selection of a number of case-studies which will refer to these drivers, and will complement the case-studies being prepared by KRTI.

- In **Phase 2**: conducting **case-studies** which are the representative sample of activities selected within the six programmatic clusters; the team will carry out visits using the necessary time over three visits to gain the trust of the respondents and good access to information; and allowing the population to identify activities and results that have been linked to their identified conflict drivers.

- In **Phase 3**: conduct a comprehensive final evaluation to capture **lessons learned** of the KRTI grant, subcontract, and STTA activities; comparing that data to the information and data collected in Phase 2 at the programmatic level and then to the findings identified in Phase 1 at the strategic level; and finally using other data sources.

The main emphasis of the evaluation methodology, supported by successive visits to the country, is on a continuous data collection process interlaced with periodic pauses for analysis and participant validation.

As part of our proposed Phase 0, a virtual evaluation **Kick-off Meeting** ("kick-off") was arranged. This featured the OTI/Washington COR and relevant staff, the SI Team, OTI/Kyrgyz Republic Country Representative, and relevant country staff. The meeting focused on providing the evaluation team with a detailed orientation to the intended outcomes of the evaluation and key considerations that should be incorporated into the team's evaluation planning. The kick-off served to update the Evaluation Plan including outcomes, deliverables and milestones; and clarify roles, responsibilities, and authorities and timelines.

The team has been collecting relevant KRTI documents and will soon begin three days of **Desk Review** to better understand the Kyrgyz operational environment, the KRTI project, and prevailing social issues, such as gender inequalities between males and females and the exclusion of minority groups. The team will review relevant project documentation collected by OTI and IRG, as well as relevant secondary data sources. Initial interviews with OTI/Washington, IRG, and other US-based stakeholders will also be conducted.

The SI Team will then hold an internal one day **Team Planning Meeting (TPM)** (please see *Table below for roles and responsibilities*). The SI Team will jointly discuss and refine the Evaluation Plan, identify potential site selection, and adapting data collection instruments. SI will use our SI's Gender Checklist to ensure that gender issues are considered for each task, and expectations for gender-disaggregated data and attention to reported changes in gender norms will be reviewed. The use of female enumerators when needed and sensitizing the team to concerns of men and women in the Kyrgyz Republic will be covered as well. Based on feedback during the kick-off meeting, potential site visits to establish a quasi-counterfactual for the evaluation will be identified. The refined Evaluation Plan, site selection, and data collection instruments will be sent to OTI for review and comment before the

field team departs. To reflect OTI's operational and management style, all "touch points" phases of this evaluation are in the field after phase 0. Throughout the field work and in between field assignments, the SI Team will communicate and share findings, provide weekly status checks and trip reports after each pre-visit.

Strategy for Responding to Specific Evaluation Questions

1 **Did the program respond appropriately to the Kyrgyz Republic's emerging democratic spaces and to the drivers of instability? What impact if any did program outcomes achieve?**

- o Were OTI's areas of programmatic and geographic focus appropriate given the political realities in the Kyrgyz Republic and OTI's role within a larger USG assistance portfolio?

- o Were OTI's revisions to strategy appropriate, given shifting political realities and windows of opportunity?

The transition drivers are identified through OTI's Rolling Assessments, and during Strategy Review Sessions. These sources of instability and democratic opportunities have changed over time. To analyze the degree to which OTI has been able to take advantage of its comparative advantage, the SI Team will triangulate data from KRTI's documented drivers, findings from the Events and Trends Mapping, and an analysis of the grants database to seek to identify changes and groupings in spending patterns.

The information generated from the Events and Trends Mapping will be used to assess the context of transition. The list of drivers—which may be different in different communities—will then be compared to those identified by the KRTI managers and staff, and then the drivers will be compared to the types of activities implemented in those communities in order to address the drivers. This will answer the question about the appropriateness of KRTI's approach (question 1).

Impact will be verified in checking the quality of the link between particular KRTI outcomes and the drivers. This will be done in terms of the intensity, extent and duration of the influence of particular outcomes on these drivers in specific case-study examples. Should this influence be weak, this will be checked against what KRTI could have done given its resources, and the political realities of the Kyrgyz Republic.

2 **Did the program reach the stated objectives?**

- o Was the program based on a coherent and logically connected set of assumptions about how change will happen, and was it implemented according to the design?

We will analyze the actual outcomes achieved within the case-studies at the level of the clusters and grants, through which KRTI has indeed exercised, or failed to exercise, its influence. This will respond to question 2 by asking first what was achieved in terms of outputs (grants delivered on the ground and in which locations), and what did that change in terms of outcomes (changes in observable behavior of the target groups, populations or organizations).

To achieve this we will proceed with the same case-study approach, based on a purposeful sampling that will cover the breadth of types of grants in the program, overlaid by a geographical balance. It is probable that we will proceed by choosing one case-study per type of cluster, but this will be discussed in the course of the first visit. We will discuss the case-studies with KRTI, and the selection will be agreed during this first visit, allowing the team to retrieve the right sort of information to prepare subsequent phases.

At the program and activity levels, it will be important to understand whether and how the clusters and the geographical grouping of interventions are motivated by the particular priorities of a specific location—for example the struggle over scarce resources in the case of water irrigation projects, and the focus on the Fergana valley for these grants. Places where there has been preponderance of

activities will be contrasted with those where more strategic isolated initiatives were undertaken, or those dealing with specific nodes of actors (such as for the media program).

3 **Did activities increase the capacity of grantees and beneficiaries to address sources of conflict and instability and/or strengthen democracy?**

- o To what extent were intermediate results (the six program clusters) met and successfully fed into program objectives?

- o Did individual activities logically address intended objectives?

The increased capacity of partners, beneficiaries and grantees is one of the unique aspects of this program. The case-studies will probably seek to carry out specific stakeholder maps within the case-studies selected in Phase 1 (the usefulness of this mapping will need to be checked during the first visit), in the course of the second wave of visits. The map will be based on two axes, the vertical one representing formal influence in society based on the participants' perceptions, and the horizontal one reflecting the degree of involvement in the sources of instability and democratization. The stakeholders are given a score based on their location, which then gives a ranking to compare with program priorities. These stakeholder maps will provide through the ranking of the influence and the degree of involvement of specific actors in the program outcomes, a good way of responding to the evaluation question. We will also resort to a qualitative analysis of the capacity building which was carried out, and the subsequent empowerment of the actors.

From this ranking the third wave of visits will be used to generate specific evidence of capacity development that can be linked back to the KRTI activities. It is foreseen that this third visit will be the most participatory in that the dialogue with the partners will focus on the more forward looking aspects of the program. Two sub-questions have been detailed in the SOW which provide further specification on how this verification can be done, focusing in particular on achieving capacity intermediate objectives, and the logic of this aspect to the drivers.

4 **What were key lessons learned from the OTI Kyrgyz Republic program and how could they be applied to future programming in the Kyrgyz Republic or elsewhere?**

- o What lessons can be applied to future programming intended to counter the drivers of social unrest and support the growth of democracy?

- o To what extent was OTI's approach to Monitoring and Evaluation, including the extensive tracking of six program clusters, helpful in documenting program impact and feeding into program design?

Question 4 touches on the key lessons that can be drawn from the program. The evaluation will respond to this question in the course of the second and third visit, and will do so by enlisting the thinking of informed external and internal stakeholders (internal being defined as the IP and OTI staff).

In the second visit the evaluation team will host workshops in Bishkek with an informed audience where some of the findings of previous M&E studies will be presented. This is a specific request presented orally to the team at the kick-off meeting, and is designed to be the final send-off for these studies. It is referred to in the SOW under Section of the original SOW[10]. This will probably be done in the case of the M-Vector assessments on social infrastructure and irrigation, which are due to be presented, and also possibly on some of the small scale studies carried out subsequently. The notes from previous monitoring assignments will also be used to inform these responses.

---

[10] This stated that "The Evaluation Team will provide ongoing technical support to strengthen the organizational and technical capacity of the local research firm, both in-country and remotely, during the design of the methodology, field implementation, and final analysis."

In the third visit the team will carry out focus group sessions with roughly the same group of participants which joined the Events and Trends Mapping focus group discussions in the first visit. This will be the method by which the evaluation can truly claim to be participatory. These groups (some at community level, some with national level partners, at least one with KRTI staff) will be presented with the conclusions of the evaluation in relation to the key drivers and tailored carefully for the audience, and be given a chance to comment. They will also be asked to identify key elements which they see as important. These will be then presented at a final debriefing for KRTI staff and external stakeholders in Bishkek.

Approach for Mitigating Specific Challenges

The main challenge for KRTI is to compile all the results achieved into an overall balance of impact. The aggregation of outcomes is based on a representative sample of the activities documented in the KRTI activities database, where the SI Team will carry out a text analysis to define the activities that address the key conflict drivers. This will allow qualitative data to be quantified through simple coding, which then supports robust data analysis. The results of the analysis of the activities will then be synthesized with the findings from the FGDs and KIIs, as well as the Events and Trends Mapping. The data sets required are consequently the following, in the order in which they will need to be collected:

- A ranking of key drivers of conflict and transition;

- Results and changes in targeted sectors, populations or institutions identified by the population;

- Identification of the capture of multiplier effects, appropriateness of clusters, and coverage of catchment areas; and

- Analysis of the profile of the 400 or so KRTI grants, in relation to these three previous elements.

While this is not at all the same as the aggregation of results from a quantitative representative sample in a "large n" study, the SI approach nevertheless allows solid generalization and assessment of broader program impact.

The program has generated a considerable amount of information on its own performance, and the findings of this mixed method evaluation will be triangulated with the high level information generated independently over the life of the program, including:

- The KRTI activities database, which contains large amounts of information on outputs, outcomes (utilization of outputs by the population), and impact;

- Independent studies performed by research companies such as M-Vector and SIAR. These include household surveys, focus group discussions and in-depth qualitative interviews. This evidence base has been thoroughly quality controlled;

- Other evaluations and country studies carried out by other donors, research bodies, USG, or foundations – most identified during the deep dive desk study prior to the first field pre-visit; and

- "Success stories" generated by KRTI throughout the process.

Finally, to assess the success of OTI's approach through KRTI compared to other activities, we will use a "goal free" approach for the field trips (based on case-studies drawing in a first step on a representative sample, and on second step on the nature of the key drivers identified).

In this approach, actual drivers are the focus rather than intended program outcomes. As such, evaluation tools are designed to the situation within the communities where KRTI beneficiaries are located rather than focusing on whether or not specific project goals have been achieved. The goals and

---

their achievement are then analyzed in relation to the drivers. This allows the evaluation team to understand a broader base of change, focusing less on an established theory of change and more on significant outcomes achieved.

This data will then be analyzed with the results of KRTI's cluster of activities in the same communities, in order to identify correlations and competing factors, which may have had an effect on the results. Through this analysis, the team will determine the extent to which certain results can or cannot be deemed attributable to KRTI programming.

Evaluation Planning Matrix

Evaluation Question	Indicator of Achievement	Means of Verification	Data Source
Did the program respond appropriately to the Kyrgyz Republic's emerging democratic spaces and to the drivers of conflict and instability? What impact if any did program outcomes achieve?	Intense, extensive and durable influence was exercised on key drivers of conflict and instability	Events and Trend Mapping; tracking of the connection between outcomes and drivers of transition	Focus group discussions (FGD), key informant interviews (KII); documentation
Did the program reach the stated objectives?	Actual outcomes achieved at the level of the Clusters and grants; actual change in terms of outcomes	Case-study approach; Events and Trend Mapping; tracking of the connection between outcomes and drivers of conflict and instability	Focus group discussions (FGD), key informant interviews (KII); documentation
Did activities increase the capacity of grantees and beneficiaries to address sources of conflict and instability and/or strengthen democracy?	Increase in capacity of partners, beneficiaries and grantees	Case-study approach; tracking of the connection between outcomes and drivers of conflict and instability	Stakeholder mapping; documentation; KII
What were key lessons learned from the OTI Kyrgyz Republic program and how could they be applied to future programming in the Kyrgyz Republic or elsewhere?	Mechanisms and procedures for learning from "success" and from "failure" are in place and employed for re-programming	Events and Trend Mapping; tracking of the connection between outcomes and drivers of conflict and instability	Interviews with external and internal stakeholders; documentation

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

SI remains committed to the principles of local engagement, capacity building and ownership and has developed a staffing strategy that ensures our team's ability to work across the north and south of the Kyrgyz Republic.

STAFF MEMBER	POSITION	ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Emery Brusset (Channel)	Evaluation Expert, Field Team Leader	Responsible for providing technical direction and overall guidance for evaluation activities in the field. Leads and manages day-to-day implementation of project activities and events. Establishes appropriate mechanisms to ensure that progress is regularly tracked and reported

		in conformity with the schedule of deliverables and will raise any issues with OTI/Kyrgyz Republic and the SI Project Manager. Provides quality assurance and quality compliance on all field deliverables. Ensures the field team is providing actionable evaluation data.
Andre Kahlmeyer (Channel)	Evaluation Analyst, Field Team	Provides direct support to the Evaluation Expert throughout the evaluation. Supports the methodological components of this evaluation including: survey design, focus group management, and key informant interviews.
Alisher Ibragimov (SI)	Evaluation Analyst , Field Team	Responsible for data management and localization of evaluation activities. Conducts any needed regression analysis and will be responsible for cleaning and managing all data.
Ainura Umetalieva (SI) and Gulfiza Ganieva (SI)	Data Analyst(s), Field Team	Responsible for compiling data, entering data electronically, assisting the team in generating information products and other duties as assigned. Provide translation, logistics and communications support. SI proposes two Data Analysts, one to support data collection and logistics in the north, and one to support data collection and logistics in the south. For gender considerations, both Data Analysts presented are female.
Mathias Kjaer (SI)	Project Manager	Responsible for the coordination of all HQ based activities including the EKO and US-based TPM. Supports the desk study efforts, and coordinates US-based presentations. Provides on-going support to the field team. If issues arise during the data collection efforts in Kyrgyz Republic that the field team that cannot resolve, coordinate with the appropriate SI and OTI leadership to find resolution.
Gabrielle Plotkin (SI)	Project Assistant	Supports the field team from SI HQ and primarily support the travel arrangements, logistics and preparation of final deliverables.
Heather McHugh (SI)	SI IQC Manager, HQ	As a former OTI staffer, familiar with OTI's culture and business model, Ms. McHugh will provide senior management oversight for this IQC aligning resources with project needs and monitoring high OTI client satisfaction with the project.

The team will also utilize the services of local translators when this is required.

DELIVERABLES

1. Evaluation Plan including data collection methodology (due June 30, 2013).

2. Detailed SOWs for field visits.

3. Weekly meeting with OTI while in-country as needed.

4. Draft Evaluation Report of no more than 30 pages (due December 5, 2013).

5. Debriefing with OTI/Kyrgyz Republic and IRG staff (by November 29, 2013)

6. Debriefing with OTI/Washington, include a final PowerPoint presentation. (by December 15, 2013)

7. A Final Evaluation Report of no more than 40 pages (due January 2014).

8. Final debriefing with OTI, IRG, and other USG personnel in Washington, D.C. (due January 2014), including final PowerPoint presentation with key findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

BRIEF SOWS FOR FIELD VISITS AND UPDATED GANTT CHART

The team will organize their work around the different field visits. The following activities are foreseen:

- **First visit:** After arrival in Bishkek, there will be team meeting and client briefing, clarification of the targeting of specific stakeholder groups and area for Events and Trends mapping. The entire team (Ainura, Gulfiza, Alisher, André, Emery, with one interpreter) will travel to one site to begin carrying out one joint mapping exercise, after which the team will split up and carry out mapping sessions in different locations. A preliminary summary debriefing session will be carried out in KRTI offices towards the end of the visit. Case-studies will then be chosen based on the drivers identified and a comparison with the database and GIS location of activities.

    Between visits: The team will analyze the sample of activities selected to identify findings from monitoring reports, including directly from the database. Indications of outcomes will then be framed in a simple system around specific drivers.

- **Second visit:** The team will visit separate locations to compare the reported outcomes with observable reality at the case-study sites, and seek to carry out in-depth interviews with the key populations or institutions. There will also be focus group discussions, very possibly linked to the same group involved in the Events and Trends mapping, which may either focus on the question of impact or on stakeholder analysis. Some presentations of the findings of monitoring reports will also be carried out as part of the evaluation process during this visit.

Third visit: The same case-studies and focus groups will be visited again as part of the third visit by evaluation sub-teams to provide evidence of capacity building, and to validate emerging findings. There will be a final phase of discussion and debriefing which is internal to KRTI, followed by debriefings with USG, and then external stakeholders.

ANNEX B: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON METHODOLOGY

Events and Trends Mapping

The mapping method, which is called Events and Trends Mapping, is a codified participatory approach which takes place in a Focus Group format, eliciting a limited number defined tipping points in a socio-political transition. It works through repeated discussions with a wide range of stakeholders, and is designed to elicit as openly as possible their perceptions on sensitive aspects, combining a variety of perspectives into a complex contribution scenario, looking into the past, or looking forward.

The actual mapping operates as a 3 hour-long discussion during which events and trends are gathered on post-it notes and arranged on large sheet of papers in front of the participants. The participants, selected for their particular and varying perspectives, recount the story to two facilitators who then transcribe the events and/or trends onto the post-its which are placed on the sheets of paper on a wall. As the discussion evolves, lines are drawn between different trends and events, depicting lines of contribution, for instance, showing that an event increases the probability of another. Little by little, lines are drawn around particular changes, which are identified as drivers.

The mapping sessions take on very different forms depending on the audience. For example, sessions in Talas tended to be exhaustive and led to intense discussion among participants who saw the exercises as a means of telling the story without having to agree on responsibility or blame. Sessions conducted with community groups in Batken elicited curious and cautious conversations which necessitated a degree of informality and extra time for translation. In Bishkek however, mapping sessions were perceived as opportunities to enthusiastically interact and unpack a complex local situation.

The conflict analysis hence super-imposed two levels. Initially, an academic approach was used, employing a literature review, including several conflict analyses on the instability in the Kyrgyz Republic. The evaluation team conducted this review in order to identify of key conflict drivers as presented in current research; the findings of the study are described in the Phase 1 evaluation report. Subsequently, the evaluation team organized nine Events and Trends Mapping sessions in different locations in the Kyrgyz Republic, involving stakeholders from a variety of backgrounds, including villagers in two cases. This was—in essence—an ethnographic method, using qualitative capture of pluralist views and a quantitative comparative scoring.

For the analysis, the team gauged the perceptions of a wide range of stakeholders regarding the salience of contextually defined events and trends through the use of a mapping method. The team's challenge was to avoid projecting its own interpretation of the situations described, and instead capture a multi-narrative understanding. The stakeholders may be diplomatic and aid officials in the capital, government administration personnel and journalists in the provinces, as well as village populations in truly isolated areas and all forms of civil society. The participants were not all literate and occasionally relied on visual patterns and oral descriptions using the recurrence of events and trends as cues in order to recall their knowledge of the conflict.

The selection of the participants in these mapping sessions was based on the nature of the hypotheses formulated by the evaluation team (particularly the national staff) in the first stage of the evaluation and further refined in the case-studies. The participants were identified independent stakeholders and KRTI beneficiaries.

Case-studies

Eighteen case-studies were sampled using a two-stage screening process; the first stage was designed to ensure that some 18 reference activities were selected against the key drivers of transition.

The first set of criteria for the selection of the sample of case-studies is:

- A balance between the north and the south as well as a balance between urban, rural, and the national level, plus activities that cover the life of the program (2010 for the earlier activities, 2011-12 for mid-term ones, 2013 for the final ones); and

- Focus on one to two drivers per selected Oblast.

The core activity for each case-study was identified using these criteria on the basis of the grant title and of the programming themes marked in the database. If in this programming theme or region there were more than one or two activities, the team randomly selected one of them[11].

A **second stage screening** was done collaboratively with KRTI to ensure that related activities were fully identified and integrated, leading to **54 individual activities** being visited and reviewed in detail out of 450, representing roughly a 13% sample.

The second set of criteria is more qualitative and seeks out other activities which are grouped around the core sample from the first screening. This is to ensure that the case-studies are faithful to KRTI thinking—that it is based on certain hypotheses and tacit planning which is inherent to OTI programming but not obvious from the database.

The manner in which the case-studies are designed is specific to the highly adaptive programming which is OTI's strength. While the first screening was completely independent from KRTI consultation (although final approval was sought and obtained), the second screening tapped into the wealth of experience and knowledge that exists within the KRTI team.

There are a number of inter-connected grants within the database that are not clearly marked as such. These are connected because of two reasons: 1) to build a set of activities which lead to a logic continuation and bigger result (e.g. impact); 2) to build the capacity of their partners. KRTI has carefully chosen their partners.

Through the case-studies, the evaluation team sought to understand the thrust of KRTI programming in the successive activities. This inter-connectedness was captured through interviews with the GMs and PDOs, as well as the senior IRG and OTI staff, and then checked through field visits.

The case-studies have been analyzed in terms of the eight questions contained in the SOW, and the main findings are summarized in the sections below. The impact dimension was obtained by using a probabilistic method, which tests the influence of case-study outcomes (in other words, the outcomes achieved by a group of activities) on a key driver. The method applied three tests:

- **Was the influence well targeted at the driver as it was expressed locally**? For example: unfounded rumors are often circulated via SMS, newsletters, or word-of-mouth. Many of these rumors play on the fears and mistaken perceptions of ethnic communities. Did an activity clearly influence the content or dissemination of such rumors?

- **What proportion of the target population was influenced by the outcomes**? For example, there may be a perception of insecurity and fear which widens the gaps between population groups. As part of one grant, KRTI rehabilitated Komsomol Park in Osh city (OSH006). The outcomes were that the park brought a community together by giving it common ground, as well as spurred municipal authorities to pave adjacent roads and prioritize the rehabilitation of other parks. In this case, the target population was exceeded.

- **What are the timing, repetition, and duration of the influence of an outcome on a driver?** One early strategy to undercut the ability of spoilers to foment unrest aimed at promoting

---

[11] This is done by using a random number generator http://www.random.org/, where we identified an activity that directly responds to a key driver. If a generated random number does not yield an activity that directly addresses the driver then the team selected next most relevant activity.

interaction between ethnic communities to highlight commonalities and rebuild broken relationships. KTI has tagged a number of activities in this case-study. The listed outputs for this cluster count the events and trainings that focus on strengthening understanding and mitigating conflict. One would ask whether this was situated around an incident of violence, synchronized with it, and whether these events were occasional and scattered or part of a sustained delivery.

To synthesize this information, the evaluation used a balanced score card method whereby a score on a Likert scale of 5 was given to each case-study outcomes. This can be represented in the following manner:

Impact on drivers

	Based on the scale of the group of activities:	What is the average score?
The scoring method does not require chains of effects, but is a test of the strength of the connection of the outcomes to the drivers.		
Relevance	• How closely aligned are the outcomes to key Drivers/actors?	Score on a scale of 5, in which: 1 = negligible influence
Extent	• What proportion of the target group were affected, over what area?	2 = marginal influence or influence on minor aspects of a driver
Duration	•Was the intervention timely, did it last long enough, and was it repeated often enough?	3 = average influence which justifies the resources used 4 = strong influence 5 = exceptionally strong influence
Impact	•How significantly are the activities contributing to change at the level of goal?	

This provides qualitative, yet comparable data across the case-studies so one can compare clusters or averages. This avoids the difficulty of having to aggregate incomparable data or rely on poorly formulated surveys with no baseline for impact information. It provides a point of reference to compare the performance of different clusters.

ANNEX C: RESULTS FROM EVENTS AND TRENDS MAPPING EXERCISES

During Phase 1, the team formed and established 11 Reference Groups (RGs) and conducted 11 Events and Trends Mapping Exercises (FGDs) throughout Kyrgyz Republic with 6-10 participants per FGD. These RGs are located in Osh city and Uzgen, Osh Oblast, Batken, Toktogul, Jalalabad Oblast in the south, Talas and Tokmok, Ghui Oblast in the north, Bokonbaevo, Issyk-Kul, Bishkek city, National and including two RGs comprised of KRTI and IRG staff in Bishkek and Osh cities. The more detailed results are in a Dropbox folder. Top 10 ranked drivers (events are highlighted in yellow) as identified through the exercises were:

Consolidated conflict drivers (ranked by team):

Trends & Events	Ranking
Ethnic conflicts, growing tensions between ethnic groups	75
Corruption	72
Poor and weak governance	71
Family clan and Maksim Bakiev, Bakiev business on selling water, monopolization of power	68
Dissatisfaction with and lack of trust in government, nontransparent and often change of key-figures	60
June events in Osh	52
April 2010 Revolution	51
Lack of actions from Law-enforcement, weak judiciary and executive system	46
Crime, looting, increased youth criminality, weft of weapon in the South	44
Control over and dependence of mass-media, biased reporting, limited freedom	42
Migration internal, external (incl. labor migration, refugees etc.)	41
Social distress, dissatisfaction, frustration	40
Increased unemployment, particularly among youth	40

Still relevant issues:

Corruption

Ethnic tension

Unemployment

Poor governance

Migration internal, external

Increased poverty rates

Connection of government authorities and criminal world

Inefficiency and ineffectiveness of tax system

Child violence

22 July, Bishkek, KRTI National Staff

Trends & Events	# of Arrows
Protest April 7, 2010	14
Ethnic violence, South	11
Family taking power 2005-2010	7

Rumors about Bakiev selling water from artificially impounded water bodies in the south	6
Assassination of the Heads of Resident Offices	5
Increased tariffs for electricity	5
Bakiev fleeing December 12, 2010	5
Closed borders	5
Perceptions: Increased Corruption	4
Increased Mobile tariffs	4
Bakiev private business achieve	4
Theft of weapon, South	4
Start of Violence, Osh	4
Constitution referendum, June 2010	4
Donors' support in the South	4
Presidential elections, October 2011	4
Murdering of political leaders for personal purposes	3
Hope for Change	3
Murdering	3
North-South separation	3
Ethnic division	3
Naryn-Russian agreement signed	3

23 July, Batken

Trends & Events	# of Arrows
Corruption	9
Protest April 7, 2010	9
Osh events	9
"Maksim Bakiev" meaning taking over of SMEs by ruling family; after fall of regime, this caused problems with privatization perceived as unfair and non-transparent	8
New government	5
Interim government	4
Family Clan ruled the country	3
Dissatisfaction of the people on the South	3
Decrease of international business in KR	3
Donors supporting financially, but inefficient	3
Increased Tariffs for the cellphone connection	2
Nontransparent privatization and selling of national estate	2
Russia supporting opposition in Kyrgyz Republic	2

24 July, Osh – KRTI staff

Trends & Events	# of Arrows
June events, 2010	13
Inter-ethnic tensions	21
Limited freedom of mass-media, biased reporting and controlled mass-media	18

Demonstrations in-front of the White House (2010)	10
Division in parliament for South and North	7
Gathering people for protests	7
Opposition meetings in winter, 2010	7
Key-figures are not transparent	6
Ignorance of protests by government	6
Perception of growing insecurity, increased fear among Uzbeks	6
Maksim Bakiev	5
Decreased trust towards government	5
Frustration of people	5
Uzbeks demanding equality	5
Poor management of international aid	5
Increase of fear in all ethnic groups	5
Weak law-enforcement	4
Poor and non-transparent budget management	4
Increased electricity/gas tariffs	4
Arrest of opposition leaders	4
Disagreement of Osh and national government on management of aid	4
Minorities do not receive aid	4
Burning and stealing in markets	4
Control of businesses by mafia-groups	3
Kyrgyz population was not happy that majority of businesses belong to the Uzbeks, and they live better	3
Poor management of natural resources	3
Dissatisfaction towards Bakiev's promises	3
Uzbek political leaders attack Kyrgyz leaders	3
Fear of the Kyrgyz about Uzbeks establishing an autonomous republic in the South	3
Hope for democracy, transparency	3
Perception: Uzbeks receive more aid, than Kyrgyz	3
Weak police	2

24 July, Osh city

Trends & Events	# of Arrows
Corruption	15
Family clan and Maksim Bakiev	11
Dissatisfaction of political opposition and the population with the governance	8
Increased electricity, mobile, and gas tariffs	7
Crisis of constitutional government	6
Increased food prices	5
Pressure on NGOs organizing meetings	4
Internal and External Migration	4
Electricity cuts	4

Control over and quality of mass-media	4
Double game with an American military airbase	3
Dissatisfaction with Kumtor deal/Management of natural resources and revenues	2

New Points

Decrease in education due to corruption.

Unemployment rate lead youth and motivated them to actively participate in meetings and demonstrations on the financed base.

25 July, Uzgen, Osh Oblast

Trends & Events	# of Arrows
Dissatisfaction with and lack of trust in government	19
Increased unemployment rate	15
Increased internal and external migration	14
Weak governance	10
Lack of actions from Law-enforcement	10
Frequent change of the key-positions in government system	10
Corporate raiding	9
Non transparent privatization/artificial bankruptcy of businesses	9
Extremist powers' activation	7
Growing tension between ethnic groups	7
Social injustice towards minorities	6
Lack of manufacturing	5
Increased food prices	5
Increased rates of crime	5
Weak Economy	4
Lack of security	4

25 July, Talas city

Many links and trends and events interconnect into flows. There are three central elements: the violence of 2010, the border and road events leading to economic issues, and then the mining-youth central element which dominates the later scene.

The drivers are:

Trends & Events	# of Arrows
Youth are increasingly agitated	11
April 2010 revolution	9
Youth Policy in Action Network created	5
Border negotiations	5
Talas People's Friendship Movement	4
Government increasingly pushing for the 4 mining concessions	4

As opposed to the mapping in Bishkek, the dynamics intensify in 2013. This coincides with the sense that the Province is cut off from the center, and the dynamics in Talas are spinning into their own logic. This

revolves around youth and is intensifying, indicating a possible new outcome. For this group at least, donors and USAID have a big influence.

25 July, Toktogul, Jalalabad Oblast

There are three clusters of issues revolution, justice and corruption tied to Parliamentary politics ('120 dragons'), and then international politics linked to investment (Chinese and Russian). The problem of loss of land and remoteness are tied to the economic difficulties with a focus on youth emigration and criminality.

There are few drivers:

Trends & Events	# of Arrows
Corruption	10
Revolution 2010	8
Parliamentary system established	6
Youth unemployment	5
Youth criminality	5

There were many reactions to youth emigration, big industrial projects (including Kumtor), and to corruption. A lot of small events take place with a high profile (arrest of the sons of MPs, bicentenary of the national hero Kurmanjan Datka).

There were a lot of political statements about democracy, language and international influence via aid agencies.

29 July, Tokmok, Chuy Oblast

Trends & Events	# of Arrows
New Parliament system	11
Consequences of the political system	6
Political crisis in 2010	6
Meetings, protests	5
Closure of the factories	4
Good interethnic relations in Tokmok	3
Cross-border issues increased	3
Low salary	3

Other identified issues 2013

Religious intolerance
Job placement for youth
Huge gap between the population and the government

Migration of ethnic Kyrgyz from Tajikistan to Chuyoblast

30 July, Bokonbaevo, Issyk-Kul oblast

Trends & Events	# of Arrows
Change of power	15
Level of corruption decreased	10
Tourism development	6
Migration among rural youth	5

New salary system is introduced in education	4
Influence of Russia increasing	4
Role of local councils increasing	4

31 July, Bishkek city, Bishkek

Trends & Events	# of Arrows
Complicated system of obtaining the national ID cards and international passports, people without passports	24
Social distress	22
Crisis in country's economy, black (off the books) economy	22
Corruption	20
Limited national budget as an excuse for low financing of social security sector, ineffective system of social security	19
Weak capacity of civil servants at all levels/weak public service human resources policy	18
Connection of government authorities and criminal world	16
Ethnic conflicts	16
Clashes between political leaders	16
Increase for tariffs for utilities and mobile services	15
Poor governance	15
June events in Osh	15
Monopolization of power	14
High poverty rates	14
Unemployment	14
Migration internal, external	14
Hidden ethnic conflicts	13
April'10 events	11
Control over and dependence of mass-media, biased reporting	11
Adopted Social Strategy and Plan for 2012-2014	10
Inefficiency and ineffectiveness of tax system	9
Talas conflict, Kumtor conflict	9
Tribalism in the governance	8
Corporate raiding	7
Financial barriers to access to public services	7
Lack of information related to taxation, public services. Lack of transparency	6
Creation of business through privatization of lands	6
Lack of trust in government	6
Interim government	6
Child abuse	6
Lack of natural resources	5
Cancellation of social allowances	5
Inefficient budget management	5
Citizen service center	5

Still valid issues

Corruption after events
Increased poverty rates
Unemployment
Poor governance
Connection of government authorities and criminal world
Migration internal, external
Inefficiency and ineffectiveness of tax system
Child abuse
Ethnic tension

31 July, Bishkek city, National

Trends & Events	# of Arrows
Poor Governance	16
Weak judiciary and executive system	24
Corruption	14
Ethnic conflicts, South	14
People's dissatisfaction	13
Monopolization of power	10
Controlled Mass-Media, biased reporting	9
Increased crime	9
Lack of equity	8
Low income	7
Political crisis	7
Unemployment	6

ANNEX D: LIST OF PERSONS MET

Below is the list of persons interviewed, either in individual or in group format, by the evaluation.
Reference Groups

City	Surname, Name	Org. and function	♂♀	Date
Talas	Jarkynalieva Telegey	Talas province library, director	♀	*25 July 2013*
	Esenbaeva Elmira	Talas province library	♀	
	Turdugulova Jyldyz	"Nurbala" public fund	♀	
	Akmatova Ainura	"Tenir koldoo" NGO	♀	
	Jusupova Nazira	"Media most" public fund	♀	
	Sarchaev Maksat	"Talas jashtary" youth NGO	♂	
	Medetov Bektur	"Agenty peremen" public fund	♂	
	Dildebekov Amantur	Student of Talas State University	♂	
	Kamaldinov Bakhtiyar	Talas citizen	♂	
	Shukiev Anarbek	Trainer-consultant	♂	
Toktogul	Rysbekova Kenjebu	Project leader	♀	*25 July 2013*
	Mambetov Bakhtiyar	Jany-jol municipality, specialist on youth	♂	
	Kubatbekov Omuraly	Head of Kyzyl-tuu village	♂	
	Majapova Satina	Teacher of English	♀	
	Jamankulova Gulnara	NGO "Coalition for Democracy"	♀	
	Ermenbaeva Sayrakan	Teacher	♀	
	Kojomuratov Doolotbek	Head of Ketmen-tobo municipality	♂	
	Jolokov Tursunaly	Representative of Ministry for emergency	♂	
	Tilekov Sagyndyk	Fish cooperative	♂	
	Bedelbaev Zamirbek	Toktogul district state administration	♂	
	Halilov Mamyr	Head of Fish cooperative	♂	
	Tilenbaev Ermek	Representative of "Respublika" political party	♂	
	Asanmoldoev Farhat	Fish cooperative	♂	
	Konushbek uulu Tursulan	Megacom representative	♂	
	Attokurov Kuttubek	Beeline representative	♂	
Bokonbaevo	Tenizbaeva Salkyn	Altyn Oymok public fund	♀	*30 July 2013*
	Tokurov Edik	Unemployed		
	Sopieva Lilya	teacher, local council member of Kyn-chygysh municipality	♀	
	Jakshylykova Nasipa	"Rahat" hotel administrator	♀	
	Toktashev Mirlan	Accountant	♂	
	Kubatov Adilet	accountant Tort-gul municipality	♂	
	Li Antonina	"Shoola Kol" public fund	♀	

	Bayalieva Aigul	Head of local council of Kajysay municipality	♀	
	Baiturova Aitkul	Accountant	♀	
	Choytonbaev Bakyt	chief of territorial public council	♂	
Tokmok	Cheremnova Elena	Teacher of Russian language and literature	♀	*29 July 2013*
	Mambetova Gulmira	Teacher of Kyrgyz language	♀	
	Rudenko Viktor	Retiree	♂	
	Hramzova Galina	Teacher of history	♀	
	Djamalov Mamaed		♂	
	Djamalov Rustam	Student	♂	
	Musaev Beksultan	Student	♂	
	Ushirova Sofiyan		♀	
	Gafarov Chyngyz	Pupil	♂	
	Mashaylo Zeinap	Teacher	♀	
Talas	Jarkynalieva Telegey	Talas province library, director	♀	*5 November 2013*
	Esenbaeva Elmira	Talas province library	♀	
	Struchkov Igor	IT specialist	♂	
	Medetov Bektur	"Agency peremen" public fund	♂	
	Dildebekov Amantur	Student of Talas State University	♂	
	Doronbekova Asel	"Agency peremen" public fund	♀	
	Shukiev Anarbek	Trainer-consultant	♂	

In-depth Interviews

Group Description	Name, Surname	Org. function	♀	♂
Consultation Jalal-Abad			**6**	**6**
	Cholpon ERGESHOVA	Public Fund ABAD, Programme Specialist	♀	
	Uulkan IRANOVA	Public Fund ABAD, Programme Specialist	♀	
	Zamir SYDYKOV	Public Fund ABAD, Programme Coordinator		♂
	Mahburat TOPCHUBAEVA	Public Advisory Board Nooken, Member	♀	
	Myrzamidin MAMADIEV	Local Council Nooken, Member		♂
	Asanbek AKMATALIEV	Uzgen district Karool municipality council, Chairman		♂
	Altynay BAIMURATOVA	Mayor's office, Senior Specialist	♀	
	Malika MUSTAPAKULLOVA	Mayor's office, Head of Department	♀	
	Mairambek ADYLBEKOV	NGO "Development of Young Citizens', Director		♂
	Nurbek JOLDOSHEV	NGO "Development of Young Citizens', Specialist		♂
	Gulmira KUDAIBERDIEVA	Sputnik Territorial Committee, Head	♀	
	Murataly UCHKEMPIROV	Ministry of youth, Department for interaction with youth organizations		♂
Consultation Toktogul			**3**	**2**
	Toktobubu MUNDUZBAEVA	Public Advisory Board, Chairperson	♀	
	Toktosun MUSURALIEV	Public Advisory Board, Member		♂
	Marart KALMURZAEV	Mayor of Toktogul town		♂
	Nurila KULUZAKOVA	Department of Finance, Head, Toktogul town	♀	
	Kubanych DERBISHEV	Toktogul town Council, Chairman	♀	
Consultation Talas			**3**	**3**
	Aimira JUMASHEVA	NGO "Aikol", Project Specialist	♀	
	Erkinbu ESHENBAEVA	NGO "Guljigit", Director	♀	
	Mirbek AITIKEEV	Radio "Azattyk", Reporter		♂
	Aidarbek JUSUPBEKOV	Talas City Council, Chairman		♂
	Aigul SARIEVA	Talas City Council, Secretary	♀	
	Munduz DOSALIEV	Talas Moyor's office, Head of Apparatus		♂
Consultation Naryn			**0**	**3**
	Adilet ESENOV	Coalition for Democracy, Project Specialist		♂
	Nurbek MOLDOKADIROV	Naryn City Council Member		♂
	Amantur USENOV	Naryn City Council, Head of Apparatus		♂

Consultation Osh			**0**	**1**
	Dastan UMETBAY	Youth of Osh, Journalist		♂
Consultation Bishkek			**5**	**12**
	Zootbek KYDYRALIEV	Ministry of Finance, Department for monitoring and budget planning		♂
	Nazgul KURMANALIVA	Civil Initiative on Internet Policy, Project Manager	♀	
	Nazgul NANAKEEVA	Civil Initiative on Internet Policy, Project Manager	♀	
	Alexands KULINSKY	UNDP Parliament project		♂
	Ravshan JEENBEKOV	Parliament Member		♂
	Orozbek DUYSHEEV	Public Advisory Board-State Agency for Geology & Mineral Resources, Chairman		♂
	Bektur ISKENDER	Public Fund "Kloop Media", Director		♂
	Nadiya NURILINA	Co Ltd "Bristol", marketing department	♀	
	Nurlan JOLDOSHEV	Association of Legal entities "Alliance for Budget Transparency", Consultant		♂
	Aibek ISAKOV	Trainer		♂
	Azat UZAKOV	"Infosystema" government organization under the Ministry of Finance, Analyst		♂
	Ahmat MADEJUEV	NGO "Center for Public Policy"		♂
	Dinara SHAVRALIEVA	NGO "Center for Public Policy", Director	♀	
	Jamalbek BALTAGULOV	NGO "Union of Local Self-Governments of KR, Director		♂
	Azamat JUNUSOV	Eurasia Foundation in Central Asia, Project Manager		♂
	Sultanbek JUMAGULOV	Azattyk, Director		♂
	Aizada KASMALIEVA	Azattyk, Correspondent	♀	
OTI/KRTI			**1**	**8**
	Richard HASELWOOD	KRTI Country Representative		♂
	Benjamin LONG	KRTI Deputy Country Representative		♂
	Froncois Antonio VEZINA	KRTI Chief of Party		♂
	Dillion CASE	KRTI Programme Manager		♂
	Nazira MOLDALIEVA	KRTI Project Development Officer	♀	
	Janyl MOLDALIEVA	KRTI Project Development Officer	♀	
	Jyldyz SATAROVA	KRTI Project Development Officer	♀	
	Jypar BEKEEVA	KRTI Project Development Officer	♀	
	Rinat BOGDANOV	KRTI Project Development Officer	♀	
	Eleonora MAMATOVA	KRTI Project Development Officer, Osh office	♀	

ANNEX E: BIBLIOGRAPHY

Country Background:

1. 130430 FTI Handbook_Eng. Copy
2. 130430 Safer W Ferghana Valley May 2011 report
3. 130430 Safer World Early Warning 4-Kyrg-low res
4. 130430 UNHCR PERCEPTION STUDY 2012 Restricted Circulation
5. 131003 KRTI Case_Study_Book_draft_3 Richard
6. EN Safer World Central Asia brief
7. OSI Multiethnic Kyrgyz Republic 03-05-2011
8. RU Saferworld -No one asked Youth
9. Socio-Economic Mapping of Tensions and 130727 Richard Disputes in Southern Kyrgyz Republic - Research Report
10. UNDP KR Electoral Conflict Mitigation Report_FINAL_ENG 2011 09 29
11. USAID Kyrgyz Republic DG Assessment 2012 03
12. USG Kyrgyz Republic ICAF Final Report

KRTI Monitoring Studies:

1. 130402 BIS109 SIAR Focus Groups ENG 2011 04 25 FINAL DRAFT
2. 130421 Viktor Analytical report_draft_21.04.2013_eng
3. 130429 Report_Social Infrastructure_final_track change_eng
4. 130509Analytical report_Water rehabilitation_final_rus.AU comments
5. Analytical report_Water Infrastructure_English
6. BIS109 SIAR Focus Group Analysis ENG 2011 09 13
7. BIS109 SIAR Focus Group Data 2011 04 22
8. BIS109 SIAR Focus Groups ENG 2011 04 25 FINAL DRAFT
9. Community Perception Focus Group Research Solicitation Notice-Revised
10. Draft PPT_Social Infrastructure_eng
11. Draft PPT_Water Infrastucture_Eng
12. Executive Summary_Social Infrastructure English
13. Executive summary_Water Infrastructure English
14. Final Report_Social Infrastucture English
15. IRG_TalasSurvey-Final_report_edited_ENG
16. IRG_TalasSurvey-Final_report_edited_RUS
17. KRTI Research Summary
18. OTI KR ME Guidance Note V4 2013 06 draft 11
19. OTI_Kyrgyz Republic_Funding_Objective_Osh_2013-07-10
20. Socio-Economic Mapping of Tensions and Disputes in Southern Kyrgyz Republic - Research Report

Material received from OTI batch 1:

1. 130530 KRTI Task Order SOW and Deliverables
2. 130530 List of 2013 Embassy Holidays
3. 130530 Map - April 2013 – Bishkek
4. 130530 Map - April 2013 – National
5. 130530 Map - April 2013 – Osh
6. 130530 Rolling Assessment 1- Feb 2011
7. 130530 Rolling Assessment 2 - Oct 2011
8. 130530 Rolling Assessment 3 - June 2012
9. 130530 SRS 1 - Memo for SI
10. 130530 SRS 1 – Report
11. 130530 SRS 2 – Report
12. 130530 SRS 3 – Report
13. 130530 SRS 4 – Report
14. 130530 Summary of Task Order Modifications
15. DRAFTKRTILegacyBook_FORSI

Material received from OTI batch 2:

1. 130529 OTI Congress Review
2. 130605 Management Review Report-SI
3. 130605 OTI Assessment - Final SI
4. 130605 PPR 1 - Report SI
5. 130605 PPR 2 - Report SI
6. 130605 PPR 3 - Report SI
7. KRTI Legacy Book Timeline
8. OTI KR ME Guidance Note V4 2013 06 draft 11

Material received from OTI batch 3:

1. 131117 KRTI Bishkek Office Org Chart 5.08.2013
2. 131117 KRTI Osh Office Org Chart Feb 2013
3. KRTI Bishkek Office Org Chart 5.08.2013
4. KRTI Commissioned Case-studies
5. KRTI Osh Office Org Chart Feb 2013
6. KRTI_Case_Studies_Executive_Summaries
7. Omnibus_directory_eng

Maps GIS Amy Noreuil:

Checklists:

1. Checklist for Defining Quality Evaluation_tab1_bw
2. Checklist for Defining Evaluation Questions_tab1_bw
3. Checklist for Engendering Evaluations_tab1_bw

---

4. Checklist for Use of Qualitative Methods

5. Elements of an Integrated Mixed Method Research Approach_tab1_bw

6. Evaluation Matrix_tab1_bw

<u>Resources and Best Practice Documents:</u>

1. SI Concept Note - Mixed Method Design

2. TIPS - PRA Techniques_tab2_bw

3. TIPS Focus Groups

4. TIPS-Key informant interviews

5. TIPS-UsingDirectObservationTechniques

ANNEX F: SUMMARY MINUTES OF FINAL REFERENCE GROUPS

Date: 8 November 2013

Venue: Batken city

Feedback on KRTI activities

KRTI representatives visited Batken twice in 2012 and in 2013 to gather new ideas for grants. KRTI provided two grants to FTI: a) conflict analysis in Andarak village Sumbula municipality Leylek district; b) Capacity building of active part of population (head of the village, municipality representative, municipality council member, formal and informal leaders) in peacebuilding in five municipalities of Kadamjay and Batken districts.

Within the second project the awardee a) trained municipality representatives, council members and other active villagers on peacebuilding, conflict prevention; b) designed and developed a booklet on how to behave in a conflict situation step by step description; c) reviewed strategic development plans of five municipalities and worked out activities/actions on conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Beneficiaries were happy to get new furniture and equipment. The effectiveness of the project depends on the capacity of the partners, beneficiaries and the personal interest about the project.

Concerns:

- It took four or five months to KRTI to get a decision on approval of the grant. The final decision is made by Washington.

- The awardee is unsatisfied with the quality of furniture provided by KRTI within the framework of the second grant.

- KRTI is a bureaucratic organization. It required filling in things such as bio data (huge amount of information, lots of papers to be filled in).

- There is no donor reporting available to the public. Citizens, government do not have enough information how donor funding have been spent.

Recommendations:

- To replicate the project on capacity building in peacebuilding among bordering municipalities where the potential to conflict

- Elaborate the concept of conflict integration into the strategic development plans of the municipalities

- Build/increase the capacity of local NGOs

- Present new USAID program to the public, especially the grant component.

Date: 6 November, 2013

Venue: Talas city library

Agenda

- Brief recapitulation of the findings of the previous Reference Group (particularly drivers and how these were used to frame the analysis)

- Feedback on the performance of KRTI and perceptions of the participants

- Perceptions of change from 2010 to today and into the future, with some reference to the interventions of donors in the geographical sector today and in future.

1. Recall of the last events and trends mapping exercise which identified the main drivers.

The participants of the Reference Group meeting took the chance to recall the main drivers which were determined during the events and trends mapping exercise in the first phase of the evaluation, returning to the map stored at the local library. The evaluation team members presented to participants the activities of the KRTI implemented in Talas Oblast.

2. Main changes, trends or dynamics in Talas since the last RGD

- The price for beans has been increased up to 80 som (in comparison with the last year price 60 soms) which creates a welcome economic boost.

- There is a request of the oblast government to minimize the use of electricity for two hours from 6:00 am till 8:00 am in the morning and in the evening in order to decrease the electricity load.

- The border with Kazakhstan has been re-opened.

- A group of Parliamentarians conducted a field session in Talas to hear about issues around education and culture.

- New equipment for Talas Oblast TV company was provided to increase the quality of broadcasting.

- The reconstruction of the road in Talas has proven to be disappointing, as the quality was inadequate and did not follow technical norms.

3. Short presentation on preliminary findings of the evaluation

- Activities implemented in Talas. The participants underlined their appreciation and the importance of the activity related to the KRTI renovated football ground. The youth are as a consequence more actively involved in sport tournaments and collective activity.

- Unfortunately, no one among the participants had heard about the grants of the KRTI in Talas Oblast, because they were not directly or indirectly involved in implementation of the grants.

- On BIS275 and 285 participants had not heard about the open sessions of the City Council. The Director of the Talas city library who participated in the Reference Group had in fact sent several requests to the City Council to participate in an open session in order to raise the issues related to library and culture in general. Unfortunately, she was never invited to attend the open sessions. Only two people out of seven RGD participants know and saw the City Council hall which was renovated by the support of KRTI.

4. What are donors doing in Talas?

The evaluation team heard only of three UN programs:

- UN Women – work with women youth leaders on violence

- UNDF – community based radio supported

- UNDP – organizes trainings to conduct open session on municipality levels

Date: 7 November 2013

Venue: Osh,

Participants:

Agenda

- Brief recapitulation of the findings of the previous Reference Group (particularly drivers and how these were used to frame the analysis)

- Feedback on the performance of KRTI and perceptions of the participants

- Perceptions of change from 2010 to today and into the future, with some reference to the interventions of donors in the geographical sector today and in future.

One of the participants initiated the discussion by expressing her disappointment of the electoral system, whose support she hoped was included in the evaluation. The elections led to the wrong people being elected, and perpetuated the clans and tribes that distort public service. She voiced her preference for stronger authority.

The participants reacted strongly against the notion that KRTI had strengthened the capacity of the organizations, and the discussion was principally about how donations in kind, and very bureaucratic controls, only partly helped to deliver the work. There was also much appreciation however of the use by KRTI of seconded technical specialists that worked with the partners to improve their practice.

There was much discussion of how good ideas are captured by KRTI staff and then turned into projects, at times given to other organizations that had not conceived these ideas. The reporting obligations were onerous due to their rigidity, and the use of press releases particularly removed from what the partners had wanted to say.

The selection process for projects was seen as being heavily influenced by the personality of the PDO and Grant Managers, and the changes to timeframes were hard to predict and to manage for the NGOs. There was a perception that the NGOs were being turned into consulting service providers.

There was also recognition of the focus of KRTI on resolving short term problems and providing grants to able organizations. Some of these gained in visibility and status and are now more highly regarded as public actors. There was however, a perception that many of the achievements are now seen as the result of government activity.

Date: 8 November 2013

Venue: Batken city

Agenda

- Brief recapitulation of the findings of the previous Reference Group (particularly drivers and how these were used to frame the analysis)

- Feedback on the performance of KRTI and perceptions of the participants

- Perceptions of change from 2010 to today and into the future, with some reference to the interventions of donors in the geographical sector today and in future.

Feedback on KRTI activities

KRTI representatives visited Batken twice in 2012 and in 2013 to gather new ideas for grants. The participants were aware that KRTI provided two grants to FTI: a) conflict analysis in Andarak village Sumbula municipality Leylek district; b) Capacity building of the most active part of population (head of the village, municipality representative, municipality council member, formal and informal leaders) in peacebuilding in five municipalities of Kadamjay and Batken districts.

Within the second project, the awardee a) trained municipality representatives, council members and other active villagers on peacebuilding, conflict prevention; b) designed and developed a booklet on how to behave in a conflict situation step by step description; c) reviewed strategic development plans of five municipalities and worked out activities/actions on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The focus was

on helping to strengthen the status and influence of formal and informal leaders for conflict prevention in a very volatile region.

The awardee was happy to get such donations in kind, namely new furniture and equipment. Their assessment is that the effectiveness of the project depends on the capacity of the partners, beneficiaries and the personal interest about the project. There was also an agreement with the evaluation team findings about the effectiveness and favorable impact of the project.

Concerns were however expressed:

- The original perception was that KRTI was only funding Osh projects and realization then dawned that it also covered Batken. It took four to five months for KRTI to get a decision on the approval of the grant. Requests for proposals made to a large number of organizations (which presented projects) were followed by messages that in the end no funding was available. The final decision is made by a central point in the system which the partners do not know.

- The awardee was not satisfied with the quality of furniture provided by KRTI within the framework of the second grant, and there were hints of poor procurement practice.

- KRTI's bureaucratic requirements consumed a significant amount of effort. It required filling in bio data and similar forms.

- There is no donor reporting available to the public. Citizens and government do not have enough information on how donor funding have been spent.

The participants proposed some recommendations for donors seeking to intervene in the Oblast:

- Replicate the project on strengthening the capacity of key actors in peacebuilding among bordering municipalities where the potential for conflict is real. The thinking was for mediation skills and there was a concern to enhance the competence of the law enforcement personnel.

- Elaborate the concept of conflict integration into the strategic development plans of the municipalities, which has been a mainstay UNDP task in the area.

- Continue to support local NGOs which are the main forces of change in the area, apart from traders.

- For the evaluation to be translated into Russian, or at least the Executive Summary. Present the new USAID program to the public, especially the grant component.

The participants agreed with the following evaluation team conclusions:

- KRTI entered the area slowly, was not easy to read in its strategic choices, but supported very valuable projects

- KRTI did not support the capacity of the local NGOs and created a heavy administrative burden.

Date: 6 November 2013

Venue: Uzgen Oblast Administrative Building

Agenda

- Brief recapitulation of the findings of the previous Reference Group (particularly drivers and how these were used to frame the analysis)

- Feedback on the performance of KRTI and perceptions of the participants

- Perceptions of change from 2010 to today and into the future, with some reference to the interventions of donors in the geographical sector today and in future.

The perception of change in the area is dominated by the implicit issues of ethnicity (ever present but not named), of clanism and corruption. There was a perception that there is much exaggeration about the influence of fundamentalist organizations ('the beards'). The international organizations are accused of not sharing information about their activities and their work. Particular mention was made of the ARIS program.

There is still a high level of distrust of the authorities, in issues such as social services, in particular recent work done on water distribution. The government convenes public information meetings but these tend to be for the benefit of village committees, which are not representative of the broader population. The Municipal representative explained recent efforts to publish information which still does not get into the public mainstream however.

Particular mention was made of the public lighting and traffic lights in Uzgen, which one participant described as making the city look like a real city, making one proud to live there. The traffic lights resolved traffic jams and reduced inter-ethnic violence which occurred in the wake of traffic accidents. This project was described as the most visible and the most positive for years by another participant.

Date: 15 November 2013

Venue: Bishkek

Agenda:

- Brief recapitulation of the findings of the previous Reference Group (particularly drivers and how these were used to frame the analysis);

- Evaluation general findings;

- Feedback on the performance of KRTI and perceptions of the participants;

- Perceptions of change from 2010 up to date and into the future, with some reference to the interventions of donors in the geographical sector today and in future.

The representative of State Agency on LSG and inter-ethnic relations (SALSG) under the Government of the KR initiated the discussion by expressing his satisfaction of the KRTI infrastructure development projects implemented in Osh, Uzgen and Jalal-Abad. He pointed out that during his visit to the south citizens were talking about positive changes in their municipalities because of USAID OTI. People know how much OTI contributed into their communities. However he was disappointed that KRTI delivered too many trainings on conflict mitigation mostly in multiethnic communities and communities densely populated by Uzbek ethnicity. According to him it would be better if KRTI conducted such trainings in mono-ethnic Kyrgyz communities as well. People were assuming to receive grants to stimulate economic development. That could have been given a hope for radiant future. Unfortunately it did not happen.

The participants had mixed reaction to the notion that KRTI provided grants in kind to most of the awardees. The discussion was about lack of opportunity of local NGOs to get an experience and increase their capacity in doing financial management and procurement. There was an assumption that cash mode could probably contribute to the knowledge and skills of NGOs as they could have learned more, for instance, how better to do procurement, financial and administrative management. There was another opinion that through providing grants in kind was the best way for KRTI to collaborate with unofficial (not registered) organizations.

There was a discussion that the best ideas are captured by KRTI staff but at the same time KRTI did not pay much attention to the capacity building of the organizations. One of the participants mentioned that KRTI was late with the feedback during the project implementation. The awardee faced difficulties during the implementation of the project and later they managed to find a way to overcome emerging problems.

There was recognition of the KRTI approach by promptly and timely take decisions on providing grants. The KRTI continued working with those grantees that had a real interest to work together in prospect.

The participants noted that KRTI was weak in conducting impact assessment, getting lessons learned and knowledge management. However they underlined that omnibus was useful especially for the network of NGOs which helps to find the partners in different regions of the country. One of the participants underlined that the Rule of Law was not identified as the main driver and he also pointed out that 20% of the civil society organizations said that the laws should be adopted according to Shariat.

Participants provided some general recommendations:

- Institutionalization of the local NGOs, for instance, the Ministry of Youth established Youth Resource Centers in the regions by the support of USAID;

- In order to mitigate the conflict it is better to develop economic sector. Provide support to Industry and Agriculture;

- It is better to mentor local trainers rather than to involve the international trainers;

- Coordinate the donors activities to avoid overlapping and work targeted;

- It is necessary to carry out baseline studies prior to launch new projects.